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National & Kapodistrian University of Athens
We study the distribution of traffic in networks whose users try to min-
imise their delays by adhering to a simple learning scheme inspired by the
replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. The stable steady states
of these dynamics coincide with the network’s Wardrop equilibria and form
a convex polytope whose dimension is determined by the network’s redun-
dancy (an important concept which measures the “linear dependence” of the
users’ paths). Despite this abundance of stationary points, the long-term
behaviour of the replicator dynamics turns out to be remarkably simple:
every solution orbit converges to a Wardrop equilibrium.
On the other hand, a major challenge occurs when the users’ delays fluc-
tuate unpredictably due to random external factors. In that case, interior
equilibria are no longer stationary, but strict equilibria remain stochasti-
cally stable irrespective of the fluctuations’ magnitude. In fact, if the net-
work has no redundancy and the users are patient enough, we show that
the long-term average of the users’ traffic flows converges to the vicinity of
an equilibrium, and we also estimate the corresponding invariant measure.
1. Introduction. The underlying problem of managing the flow of traffic in
a large-scale network is as simple to state as it is challenging to resolve: given the
rates of traffic generated by the users of the network, one is asked to identify and
realise the most “satisfactory” distribution of traffic among the network’s routes.
Of course, given that this notion of “satisfaction” depends on the users’ optimi-
sation criteria, it would serve well to keep a concrete example in mind. Perhaps the
most illustrative one is that of the Internet itself, where the primary concern of its
users is to minimise the travel times of their data flows. However, since the time
needed to traverse a link in the network increases (nonlinearly even) as the link
becomes more congested, the users’ concurrent minimisation efforts invariably lead
to game-like interactions whose complexity precludes even the most rudimentary
attempts at coordination. In this way, a traffic distribution will be considered “sat-
isfactory” by a user when there is no unilateral move that he could make in order
to further decrease the delays (or latencies) that he experiences.
This Nash-type condition is aptly captured by Wardrop’s principle (Wardrop,
1952): given the level of congestion caused by other users, every user seeks to employ
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the minimum-latency path available to him. As might be expected, this principle
has attracted a great deal of interest and it was shown early on that these Wardrop
equilibria can be calculated by solving a convex optimisation problem (Beckmann,
McGuire and Winsten, 1956; Dafermos and Sparrow, 1969). Among others, this
characterisation enabled Roughgarden and Tardos (2002, 2004) to quantify the effi-
ciency of these equilibrial states by estimating their “price of anarchy”, i.e. the ratio
between the aggregate delay of a flow at Wardrop equilibrium and the minimum
achievable (aggregate) latency (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999).
Still, the size of large-scale networks makes computing these equilibria a task of
considerable difficulty, clearly beyond the users’ individual deductive capabilities.
Moreover, a user has no incentive to actually play out his component of an equilibrial
traffic allocation unless he is convinced that his opponents will also employ theirs
(an argument which gains additional momentum if there are multiple equilibria).
It is thus more reasonable to take a less centralised approach and instead ask: is
there a simple learning procedure which leads users to Wardrop equilibrium?
Even though the static properties of Wardrop equilibria have been studied quite
extensively, this question has been left relatively unexplored. In fact, it was only
recently that the work of Sandholm (2001) showed that a good candidate for such
a learning scheme would be the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory, a
dynamical system that was first introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) to model
the evolution of (nonatomic) populations that interact with one another by means
of random matchings in a Nash game. More precisely, these dynamics arise as the
byproduct of an “imitation of the fittest” process which drives the per capita growth
rate of a genotype (strategy) proportionately to the difference between the repro-
ductive fitness (payoff) of the genotype itself and the population average. Thus,
owing to this correlation between growth rates and payoffs, the game’s Nash equi-
libria emerge as ω-limit points of the replicator trajectories – see also the excellent
surveys by Weibull (1995) and by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, 2003).
In our congestion setting, these populations correspond to the users’ traffic flows,
so the convex optimisation formulation of Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten allows
us to recast our problem in terms of a (nonatomic) potential game (Sandholm,
2001). Indeed, Wardrop equilibria can be located by looking at the minimum of the
Rosenthal potential (Rosenthal, 1973) and, hence, Sandholm’s analysis shows that
they are Lyapunov stable rest points of the replicator dynamics. This fact was also
recognized independently by Fischer and Vöcking (2004) who additionally showed
that the (interior) solution orbits of the replicator dynamics converge to the set of
Wardrop equilibria – actually, the authors suggest that these orbits converge to a
point, but their analysis only holds when there is a unique equilibrium.
Rather surprisingly, when there is not a unique equilibrium, the structure of
the Wardrop set itself seems to have been overlooked in the above considerations.
Specifically, it has been widely assumed that if the network’s delay functions are
strictly increasing, then there exists a unique Wardrop equilibrium (for instance,
see Sandholm, 2001, Corollary 5.6). As a matter of fact, this uniqueness property
is only true in irreducible networks, i.e. networks whose paths are “independent” of
one another (in a sense made precise by Definition 2.1). In general, the Wardrop set
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of a network is a convex polytope whose dimension is determined by the network’s
redundancy, a notion which quantifies precisely this “linear dependence”. Nonethe-
less, despite this added structure, we show that the expectations of Fischer and
Vöcking are vindicated in that the long-term behaviour of the replicator dynamics
remains disarmingly simple: (almost) every replicator orbit converges to a Wardrop
flow and not merely to the set of such flows (Theorem 3.2).
Having said that, the imitation procedure inherent in the replicator dynamics
implicitly presumes itself that users have perfectly accurate information at their
disposal. Unfortunately however, this assumption is not very realistic in networks
which exhibit wild delay fluctuations as the result of interference by random exoge-
nous factors (commonly gathered under the collective moniker “nature”). In popu-
lation biology, these disturbances are usually modelled by introducing “aggregate
shocks” to the replicator dynamics (Fudenberg and Harris, 1992) and, as one would
expect, these shocks complicate the situation considerably. For instance, Cabrales
(2000) proved that dominated strategies become extinct in the long run, but only if
the variance of the shocks is mild enough compared to the payoffs of the game. More
recently, Imhof (2005) showed that even equilibrial play arises over time but, again,
conditionally on the noise processes not being too loud (see also Benaïm, Hofbauer
and Sandholm, 2008; Hofbauer and Imhof, 2009). On the other hand, if one inter-
prets the replicator dynamics as the derivative of an exponential learning procedure
and perturbs them accordingly (i.e. not as an evolutionary birth-death process), it
was shown that similar rationality properties continue to hold, no matter how loud
the noise becomes (Mertikopoulos and Moustakas, 2009a,b).
All the same, these approaches have chiefly focused on Nash-type games where
payoffs are multilinear functions over a product of simplices; for example, payoffs in
single-population evolutionary games are determined by the bilinear form which is
associated to the matrix of the game. This linear structure simplifies things consid-
erably but, unfortunately, congestion models rarely adhere to it; additionally, the
notions of Nash and Wardrop equilibrium are at variance in many occasions, a dis-
parity which also calls for a different approach; and, finally, the way that stochastic
fluctuations propagate to the users’ choices in a network leads to a new stochastic
version of the replicator dynamics where the noise processes are no longer indepen-
dent across users (different paths might share a common subset of links over which
disturbances are strongly correlated). On that account, the effect of stochastic fluc-
tuations in congestion models cannot be understood by simply translating previous
work on the stochastic replicator dynamics.
1.1. Outline. In this paper, we study the distribution of traffic in networks
whose links are subject to constant stochastic perturbations that randomly affect
the delays experienced by individual traffic elements. This model is presented in
detail in Section 2, where we also develop our game-theoretic machinery: specifically,
we introduce the notion of a network’s redundancy in Section 2.2, and we examine
its connection to Wardrop equilibria in Section 2.3. We then derive the rationality
properties of the deterministic replicator dynamics in Section 3, where we show
that (almost) every solution trajectory converges to a Wardrop equilibrium.
4 P. MERTIKOPOULOS AND A. L. MOUSTAKAS
Section 4 is devoted to the stochastic considerations which constitute the core
of our paper. Our first result is that strict Wardrop equilibria remain stochastically
asymptoticaly stable irrespective of the fluctuations’ magnitude (Theorem 4.3); in
fact, if the users are “patient enough”, we are able to estimate the average time it
takes them to hit a neighbourhood of the equilibrium in question (Theorem 4.4). In
conjunction with stochastic stability, this allows us to conclude that when a strict
equilibrium exists, users converge to it almost surely (Corollary 4.5). On the other
hand, given that such equilibria do not always exist, we also prove that the replicator
dynamics in irreducible networks are recurrent (again under the assumption that
the users are patient enough), and we use this fact to show that the long-term
average of their traffic distributions concentrates mass in the neighbourhood of an
interior Wardrop equilibrium (Theorem 4.6).
1.2. Notational Conventions. If S = {sα}nα=0 is a finite set, the vector space
spanned by S over R is defined to be the set of all formal linear combinations of
elements of S with real coefficients, i.e. the set of all functions x : S → R. In tune
with standard set-theoretic notation, we will denote this space by RS ≡ Maps(S,R).
In this way, RS admits a canonical basis {eα}nα=0 consisting of the indicator func-
tions eα : S → R which take the value eα(sα) = 1 on sα and vanish otherwise; in
particular, if x ∈ RS has x(sα) = xα, we will have x =
∑
α xαeα. Hence, under the
natural identification sα 7→ eα, we will make no distinction between the elements
sα of S and the corresponding basis vectors eα of RS – in fact, to avoid drowning in
a morass of indices, we will routinely use α to refer interchangeably to either sα or
eα, writing e.g. “α ∈ S” instead of “sα ∈ S”. In the same vein, we will also identify
the set ∆(S) of probability measures on S with the standard n-dimensional simplex
of RS: ∆(S) = {x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0}.
Concerning players and their strategies, we will follow the original convention of
Nash (1951) and employ Latin indices (i, j, . . . ) for players while reserving Greek
ones (α, β . . . ) for their (pure) strategies; also, to differentiate between strategies,
we will use α, β, . . . for indices that start at 0 and µ, ν, . . . for those that start at 1.
Moreover, if the players’ action sets Ai are disjoint (as is typically the case), we will
identify their union
⋃
iAi with their disjoint union A ≡
∐
iAi =
⋃
i
{
(α, i) : α ∈
Ai
}
by mapping α ∈ Ai 7→ (α, i) ∈ A. Hence, if {eiα} is the natural basis of RAi and
{eα} is the corresponding basis of RA ∼=
∏
iRAi , we will occasionally drop the index
i altogether and write x =
∑
α xαeα ∈ RA instead of x =
∑
i,α xiαeiα ∈
∏
i RAi .
Similarly, when it is clear from the context that we are summing over the strategy
set Ai of player i, we will use the shorthand
∑i
α ≡
∑
α∈Ai .
Finally, if X(t) is some stochastic process in Rn starting at X(0) = x and there
is no doubt that we are referring to the process X, its law will be denoted by Px.
In that case, we will also employ the term “almost surely” instead of the somewhat
unwieldy “Px-almost surely”.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Games in Normal Form. Our starting point for the definition of a game
in normal form will be a set of players N, together with a finite measure ν on N
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which “accounts” for all players i ∈ N (in the sense that the singletons {i} ⊆ N are
all ν-measurable).
The players’ possible actions in the game will then be represented by their strat-
egy sets ∆i, i ∈ N. For our purposes, we will assume that these sets are locally
compact Hausdorff spaces and that the relative topologies induced on ∆i ∩ ∆j
agree for all i, j ∈ N. Thanks to this compatibility conditon, ∆0 ≡
⋃
j ∆j inherits
a natural Borel structure arising from the union topology (the finest topology in
which the inclusions ∆i ↪→ ∆0 are continuous) and, in this way, an admissible strat-
egy profile x ∈ ∏i ∆i will just be a measurable function x : N → ∆0 which maps
i 7→ xi ∈ ∆i for all players i ∈ N. For technical reasons, we will also require that
the push-forward measure x∗ν induced on ∆0 by x (given by x∗ν(U) = ν(x−1(U))
for any Borel U ⊆ ∆0) be inner regular, and, hence, Radon (since ν is finite).
As is customary, we will identify two profiles which agree ν-almost everywhere,
except when we need to focus on the strategy of a particular player i ∈ N against
that of his opponents N−i ≡ N \{i}; in that case, we will use the shorthand (x−i; qi)
to denote the profile which agrees with x on N−i (ν-a.e.) and maps i 7→ qi ∈ ∆i.
The set ∆ of all such profiles x ∈∏i ∆i will then be referred to as the strategy space
of the game and is itself a Borel space because it inherits the subspace topology
from the product
∏
i ∆i.
Bearing all this in mind, the fitness of the players’ strategic choices will be
determined by their payoff functions (or utilities) ui : ∆→ R, i ∈ N; in particular,
ui(x) ≡ ui(x−i;xi) will simply represent the reward that player i ∈ N receives in the
strategy profile x ≡ (x−i;xi) ∈ ∆, i.e. when he plays xi ∈ ∆i against his opponents’
strategy x−i ∈
∏
j 6=i ∆j . The only further assumptions that we will make is that
these payoff functions be (Borel) measurable and that ui(x−i;xi) = ui(x′−i;xi)
whenever x and x′ agree ν-a.e. on N−i.
This collection of players i ∈ N, their strategy sets ∆i, and their payoff functions
ui : ∆ → R will be our working definition for a game in normal form, usually
denoted by G ≡ G(N,∆, u). Additionally, if the payoff functions ui : ∆ → R
happen to be continuous, the game G will be called continuous as well.
Needless to say, this abstract definition might appear somewhat opaque, so we
will immediately proceed with a few important examples to clarify the concept.
2.1.1. N -person Games. As the name suggests, the players here are indexed by
the finite set N = {1, 2, . . . N} (endowed with the usual counting measure) and the
game’s strategy space will be the finite product ∆ ≡∏i ∆i (thus doing away with
some of the technical subtleties present in the more general definition).
This point is where we recover the original scenario of Nash (1951). To see
how, assume that every player i ∈ N comes with a finite set Ai of actions (or
pure strategies) which can be “mixed” according to some probability distribution
xi ∈ ∆(Ai). In this interpretation, the players’ strategy sets are just the simplices
∆i ≡ ∆(Ai) and their payoff functions ui : ∆ ≡
∏
i ∆i → R are given by the
multilinear expectations:
(2.1) ui(x) = ui(x1, . . . xN ) =
∑
α1∈A1
· · ·
∑
αN∈AN
x1,α1 · · ·xN,αNui,α1...αN ,
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where xi =
∑i
α xiαeiα in the standard basis {eiα} of RAi and ui,α1...αN is the
reward that player i would obtain by choosing αi ∈ Ai against his opponents’ action
α−i ∈ A−i ≡
∏
j 6=iAj . Because of this (multi)linear structure, we will commonly
refer to Nash-type games as linear games to contrast them with more general N -
person games where payoffs and strategy sets might fail to have any sort of linear
structure – as is the case for example with concave games (Rosen, 1965).
2.1.2. Population Games. The cornerstone of evolutionary game theory con-
cerns games played by an uncountable number of players – for instance, see Schmei-
dler (1973). As such, these nonatomic population games require the full breadth
afforded by our more abstract definition.
The first piece of additional structure encountered in these games is a measurable
partition N =
⋃N
r=1Nr of the player set N into N disjoint populations (or classes)
Nr ⊆ N; accordingly, every player i ∈ N belongs to a unique class Nr which we de-
note by class(i). Each of these populations is then “measured” by the corresponding
restriction νr of the measure ν on Nr (i.e. νr(B) = ν(B∩Nr) for any Borel B ⊆ N),
and the basic underlying assumption is that these measures are nonatomic.
The second fundamental assumption is that this classification of players also
determines how they interact with their environment and with each other. More
precisely, this means that the strategy sets of two players that belong to the same
population coincide: ∆i = ∆j whenever class(i) = class(j). Because of this, we
will write Ar for the common strategy set of the r-th population and A0 for the
corresponding union: A0 =
⋃N
r=1Ar =
⋃
i∈N ∆i.
Now, every strategy profile x : N → A0 pushes forward a (Radon) measure xˆr
on Ar in the usual way:
(2.2) xˆr(U) ≡ (x∗νr)(U) = νr(x−1(U)) = ν{i ∈ Nr : xi ∈ U}
for any Borel U ⊆ Ar – in other words, xˆr(U) is just the measure of the play-
ers in the r-th population whose chosen strategy lies in U ⊆ Ar. Then, the final
(and perhaps most significant) requirement in population games is that the play-
ers’ payoffs depend only on the strategy distribution xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . xˆN ) and not on the
players’ individual strategic choices. Specifically, if P0(A) denotes the space of all
such strategy distributions equipped with the topology of vague convergence, we
assume that there exist continuous functions uˆr : P0(A) × Ar → R, r = 1, . . . N ,
such that:
(2.3) ui(x) = uˆr(xˆ;xi) for all i ∈ Nr.
Consequently, as long as the overall strategy distribution xˆ stays the same, payoffs
remain unaffected even by positive-mass migrations of players from one strategy to
another (and not only by migrations of measure zero).
Again, it would serve well to illustrate this abstract definition by means of a
more concrete example. To wit, in evolutionary game theory, populations are usu-
ally represented by the intervals Nr = [0,mr] where mr > 0 denotes the “mass”
of the population under Lebesgue measure. The strategy spaces Ar are typically
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assumed to be finite, so that a strategy distribution is simply a point in the (finite-
dimensional) product of simplices
∏
rmr∆(Ar). Hence, if player i ∈ Nr picks the
strategy α ∈ Ar, his payoff will be given by
(2.4) urα(x) ≡ ur(x;α),
where, in a slight abuse of notation, we removed the hats from uˆr and xˆ in order
to stress that they are the fundamental quantities that describe the game (it will
always be clear from the context whether we are referring to the distribution xˆ ∈
P0(A) or to the actual strategy profile x : N→ A0).
This choice of notation is very suggestive for another reason as well: if we set
∆r ≡ mr∆(Ar), then these simplices may be taken as the strategy sets of an
associated N -person game whose players are indexed by r = 1, 2 . . . N (that is, they
correspond to the populations themselves). The only thing needed to complete this
description is to define the payoff functions ur : ∆ ≡
∏
r ∆r → R in this picture,
and a natural choice would be to take the population averages:
(2.5) ur(x) =
1
mr
∑r
α
xrαurα(x),
where xrα are the coordinates of x in ∆. However, it is worth keeping in mind that,
depending on the situation at hand, this need not be the only reasonable choice for
a payoff function (we will explore this issue further in the next section).
Potential Games. An important subclass of population games arises when the
payoffs urα satisfy the closedness condition:
(2.6)
∂urα
∂xsβ
=
∂usβ
∂xrα
for all populations r, s and for all strategies α ∈ Ar, β ∈ As.
This condition is commonly referred to as “externality symmetry” (Sandholm, 2001)
and it describes games where a marginal increase in the population of players using
strategy α has the same effect on the payoffs to players playing strategy β as the
converse increase. Clearly, since the strategy distributions of these games live in the
simply connected polytope ∆ =
∏
r ∆r, condition (2.6) amounts to the existence
of a potential function F : ∆→ R such that:
(2.7) urα(x) = − ∂F
∂xrα
.
Hence, if a player i ∈ Nr makes the switch α→ β, his payoff will change by:
(2.8) urβ(x)− urα(x) = −
(
∂F
∂xrβ
− ∂F
∂xrα
)
= −dF (erβ − erα),
where {erβ} denotes the standard basis of
∏
r RAr . In other words, the strategy
migration α → β is profitable to a player iff the direction erβ − erα descends the
potential F . This property of potential games will be extremely important for our
purposes and its ramifications underlie a large part of our work.
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2.1.3. Nash Equilibrium and Wardrop’s Principle. Under the umbrella of ratio-
nality, selfish players will seek to play those strategies which deliver the best rewards
against the choices of their opponents. This leads to the celebrated notion of a Nash
equilibrium, i.e. a strategy profile q which discourages unilateral deviations:
(NEQ) ui(q) ≥ ui(q−i; q′i) for almost every i ∈ N and all strategies q′i ∈ ∆i
(see also Schmeidler (1973) or Milchtaich (2000)).
The seminal result of Nash (1951) was that N -person linear games always possess
equilibria of this kind. Rosen (1965) subsequently extended this result to the class
of concave games (continuous concave payoffs over convex strategy sets), while
Schmeidler (1973) essentially settled the issue for population games with finite
strategy sets (see also Ali Khan, 1986).
In this last instance, Nash equilibria are aptly captured by Wardrop’s principle:
(2.9) urα(q) ≥ urβ(q) for all α, β ∈ Ar s.t. q assigns positive mass to α.
To see this, note that if α ∈ Ar has positive measure in the strategy distribution
q, then there exists a player i ∈ Nr (actually a positive mass of such players) with
qi = α and such that (NEQ) holds. Hence, for every β ∈ Ar, we immediately get:
(2.10) urα(q) = ui(q−i;α) ≥ ui(q−i;β) = urβ(q).
If the game in question is also a potential one, we have seen that beneficial
migrations descend the potential function, so the minima of the potential corre-
spond to strategy distributions where no unilateral improvement is possible. In
fact, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the game’s potential coincide precisely with
the Wardrop characterisation (2.9) and, hence, the game’s equilibria will be the
critical points of the potential (Sandholm, 2001, Proposition 3.1).
On account of the above, the equilibrium characterisation (2.9) will be central
in our analysis, so we will examine it in depth in the sections that follow. En
passant, we only note here that a similar condition can be laid down for population
games with continuous strategy sets. This case has recently attracted quite a bit of
interest, but since we will not need this added generality, we will not press the issue
further – see instead Cressman (2005) or Hofbauer, Oechsller and Riedel (2009).
2.2. Networks and Flows. Stated somewhat informally, our chief interest lies in
networks whose nodes produce traffic that seeks to reach its destination as quickly
as possible. However, since the time taken to traverse a path in a network increases
as the network becomes congested, it is hardly an easy task to pick the “path of
least resistance” – especially given that users compete against each other in their
endeavours. As a result, the game-theoretic setup of the previous section turns out
to be remarkably appropriate for the analysis of these traffic flows.
Following Roughgarden and Tardos (2002, 2004), let G ≡ G(V,E) be a (finite)
directed graph with node set V and edge set E, and let σ = (v, w) be an origin-
destination pair in G (i.e. an ordered pair of nodes v, w ∈ V that can be joined by
a path in G). Suppose further that the origin v of σ outputs traffic towards the
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destination node w at some rate ρ > 0; then, the pair σ together with the rate ρ
will be referred to as a user of G. In this way, a network Q ≡ Q(N,A) in G will
consist of a set of users N (indexed by i = 1, . . . N), together with an associated
collection A ≡ ∐iAi of sets of paths (or routes) Ai = {αi,0, αi,1 . . .} joining vi to
wi (where σi = (vi, wi) is the origin-destination pair of user i ∈ N).
Two remarks of a book-keeping nature are now in order: first, since we will
only be interested in users with at least a modicum of choice on how to route
their traffic, we will take |Ai| ≥ 2 for all i. Secondly, we will be assuming that
the origin-destination pairs of distinct users are themselves distinct. Fortunately,
neither assumption is crucial: if there is only one route available to user i, the traffic
rate ρi can be considered as a constant load on the route; and if two users i, j ∈ N
with rates ρi, ρj share the same origin-destination pair, we will replace them by a
single user with rate ρi + ρj (see also Section 2.3). This means that the sets Ai
can be assumed disjoint and, as a pleasant byproduct, the path index α ∈ Ai fully
characterizes the user i to whom it belongs – cf. the conventions of Section 1.2.
So, if xiα ≡ xα denotes the amount of traffic that user i routes via the path
α ∈ Ai, the corresponding traffic flow may be represented as xi =
∑i
α xiαeiα,
where {eiα} is the standard basis of the space Vi ≡ RAi . However, for such a flow
to be admissible, we must also have xiα ≥ 0 and
∑i
α xiα = ρi; hence, the set of
admissible flows for user i will be the simplex ∆i ≡ ρi∆(Ai) =
{
xi ∈ Vi : xiα ≥
0 and
∑i
α xiα = ρi
}
. Then, by collecting all these individuals flows in a single
profile, a flow in the network Q will simply be a point x =
∑
i xi ∈ ∆ ≡
∏
i ∆i.
An alternative (and very useful!) description of a flow x ∈ ∆ can be obtained by
looking at the traffic load that the flow induces on the edges of the network, i.e. at
the amount of traffic yr that circulates in each edge r ∈ E of G. In particular:
(2.11) yr =
∑
i
yir =
∑
i
∑i
α3r xiα
where yir =
∑i
α3r xiα is the load induced on r ∈ E by the individual flow xi ∈ ∆. In
this manner, a very important question that arises is whether these two descriptions
are equivalent; put differently, whether one can recover the flow distribution x ∈ ∆
from the loads yr on the edges of the network.
To answer this question, let {εr} be the standard basis of the space W ≡ RE
spanned by the edges E of G and consider the indicator map P i : Vi → W which
sends a path α ∈ Ai to the sum of its constituent edges: P i(eiα) =
∑
r∈α εr;
obviously, if we set P i(eiα) =
∑
r P
i
rαεr, we see that the entries of P i will be
P irα = 1 if r ∈ α and 0 otherwise. We can then aggregate this construction over all
i ∈ N by considering the product space V ≡ RA ∼= ∏i Vi and the corresponding
indicator matrix P = P 1⊕· · ·⊕PN whose entries take the value Prα = 1 if the path
α ∈ A employs the edge r and vanish otherwise. By doing just that, (2.11) takes
the simpler form yr =
∑
α Prαxα or, even more succinctly, y = P (x). Therefore,
the question of whether a flow can be recovered from a load profile can be answered
in the positive if the indicator map P : V →W is injective.
This, however, is not the end of the matter because the individual flows xi ∈ ∆i
actually live in the affine subspaces pi+Zi where pi = ρi|Ai|
∑i
α eiα is the barycentre
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.
.
.
.
No linearly dependent paths.
α1,0
α1,1
α2,1
α2,0
(a) An irreducible network: red(Q) = 0.
.
.
.
.
α1,0 + α2,1 + α3,1 = α1,1 + α2,0 + α3,0
α1,0
α1,1
α2,1
α2,0
α3,0
α3,1
(b) A reducible network: red(Q) = 1.
Fig 1. The addition of a user may increase the redundancy of a network.
of ∆i and Zi ≡ Tpi∆i = {zi ∈ Vi :
∑i
α ziα = 0} is the tangent space to ∆i at pi – it
is also worth keeping in mind that if we set A∗i = Ai \{αi,0}, then Zi ∼= RA
∗
i . As a
result, what is actually of essence here is the action of P on the subspaces Zi ≤ Vi,
i.e. the restriction Q ≡ P |Z : Z → W of P on the subspace Z ≡ Tp∆ ∼=
∏
i Zi,
where p = (p1, . . . pN ) is the barycentre of ∆. In this way, any two flows x, x′ ∈ ∆
will have z = x′ − x ∈ Z and the respective loads y, y′ ∈W will satisfy:
(2.12) y′ − y = P (x′)− P (x) = P (z) = Q(z),
so that y′ = y iff x′ − x ∈ kerQ. Under this light, it becomes clear that a flow
x ∈ ∆ can be recovered from the corresponding load profile y ∈ W if and only if
Q is injective. For this reason, the map Q : Z → W will be called the redundancy
matrix of the network Q, giving rise to:
Definition 2.1. Let Q be a network in a graph G and let Q be the redundancy
matrix of Q. The redundancy red(Q) of Q is defined to be:
(2.13) red(Q) ≡ dim(kerQ).
If red(Q) = 0, the network Q will be called irreducible; otherwise, Q will be called
reducible.
The rationale behind this terminology should be clear enough: when a network Q
is reducible, some of its routes are “linearly dependent” and the respective directions
in kerQ are “redundant” (in the sense that they are not reflected on the edge loads).
By comparison, the degrees of freedom of irreducible networks are all active and
any statement concerning the network’s edges may be translated to one concerning
its routes.
This dichotomy between reducible and irreducible networks will be quite sig-
nificant for our purposes, so it is worth dwelling on Definition 2.1 for a bit more;
specifically, it will be important to have a simple recipe with which to compute the
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redundancy matrix Q of a network Q. To that end, let Qi ≡ P i|Zi be the restriction
of P i on Zi and, as before, let {ei,0, ei,1, . . .} be the standard basis of Vi = RAi .
Then, the vectors e˜iµ = eiµ − ei,0, µ ∈ A∗i ≡ Ai \{0}, constitute a basis for Zi and
it is easy to see that the matrix elements of Qi in this basis will be given by:
(2.14) Qirµ = P
i
rµ − P ir,0.
The above suggests that if there are too many users in a network, then it is
highly unlikely that the network will be irreducible. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 2.2. Let Q(N,A) be a network in the graph G(V,E)and let E′ ⊆ E
be the set of edges that are present in Q. Then:
(2.15) red(Q) ≥ |N| − |E′|.
Hence, a network will always be reducible if the number of users exceeds the number
of available links.
Proof. From the definition of Q : Z → W we can easily see that imQ is
contained in the subspace ofW that is spanned by E′; furthermore, since every user
has |Ai| ≥ 2 routes to choose from, it follows that dimZ =
∑
i (|Ai| − 1) ≥ |N|.
Therefore: red(Q) = dim(kerQ) = dimZ − dim(imQ) ≥ |N| − |E′|.
2.3. Congestion Models and Equilibrium. The time spent by a traffic element
on an edge r ∈ E of the graph G will be a function φr(yr) of the traffic load yr on
the edge in question – for example, if the edge represents an M/M/1 queue with
capacity µr, then φr(yr) = 1/(µr − yr). In tune with tradition, we will assume that
these latency (or delay) functions are strictly increasing, and also, to keep things
simple, that they are at least C1 with φ′r > 0.
On that account, the time needed to traverse an entire route α ∈ Ai will be:
(2.16) ωiα(x) =
∑
r∈α φr(yr) =
∑
r
P irαφr(yr),
where as before: yr =
∑
β Prβxβ . In summary, we then have:
Definition 2.3. A congestion model C ≡ C(Q, φ) in a graph G(V,E) is a net-
work Q(N,A) of G equipped with a family of increasing latency functions φr, r ∈ E.
The similarities between this definition and that of a game in normal form should
be evident: all that is needed to turn Definition 2.3 into a N -person game is to spec-
ify its payoff functions. One way to go about this is to consider the user averages:
(2.17) ωi(x) =
1
ρi
∑i
α
xiαωiα(x) =
1
ρi
∑
r
yirφr(yr),
where the last equality follows from (2.16) and the definition of yir =
∑i
α xiα.
Thus, in keeping with the equilibrium condition (NEQ), a flow q will be at Nash
equilibrium in the game G1 ≡ G1(N,∆,−ω) when:
(NE1) ωi(q) ≤ ωi(q−i; q′i) for every user i ∈ N and all flows q′i ∈ ∆i.
12 P. MERTIKOPOULOS AND A. L. MOUSTAKAS
For many classes of latency functions φr, the average delays ωi turn out to be convex
and the existence of equilibria is assured by the results of Rosen (1965). However,
not only is this not always the case but, more importantly, the user averages (2.17)
do not necessarily reflect the users’ actual optimisation objectives either.
Indeed, another equally justified choice of payoffs is given by the worst delays:
(2.18) ω˜i(x) = max
α:xiα>0
{ωiα(x)} ,
i.e. the time at which a user’s last traffic packet reaches its destination. In that
case, a flow q will be at equilibrium for the game G2 ≡ G2(N,∆,−ω˜i) when:
(NE2) ω˜i(q) ≤ ω˜i(q−i; q′i) for every user i ∈ N and all flows q′i ∈ ∆i.
Unfortunately, the payoff functions ω˜i may be discontinuous along any intersection
of faces of ∆i because the support supp(xi) = {α ∈ Ai : xiα > 0} of xi changes
there as well. Consequently, the existence of equilibrial flows cannot be inferred
from the general theory in this instance either.
On the other hand, if we go back to our original motivation (the Internet), we
see that our notion of a “user” more accurately portrays the network’s routers and
not its “real-life” users (humans, applications, etc.). However, since these routers
are not selfish in themselves, conditions (NE1) and (NE2) do not necessarily point
to the right direction either. Instead, the routers’ selfless task is to ensure that the
nonatomic traffic elements circulating in the network (the actual selfish entities)
remain satisfied. It is thus more reasonable to go back to Wardrop’s principle (2.9):
Definition 2.4. A flow q ∈ ∆ will be at Wardrop equilibrium when
(WEQ) ωiα(q) ≤ ωiβ(q) for all i ∈ N and for all routes α, β ∈ Ai with qiα > 0,
i.e. when every nonatomic traffic element employs the fastest path available to it.
Condition (WEQ) holds as an equality for all routes α, β ∈ Ai that are employed
in a Wardrop profile q. This gives ωi(q) = ωiα(q) for all α ∈ supp(qi) and leads to
the following alternative characterisation of Wardrop flows:
(WEQ′) ωi(q) ≤ ωiβ(q) for all i ∈ N and for all β ∈ Ai.
Even more importantly however, Wardrop equilibria can also be harvested from the
(global) minimum of the Rosenthal potential (Rosenthal, 1973):
(2.19) Φ(y) =
∑
r
Φr(yr) =
∑
r
∫ yr
0
φr(w) dw.
The reason for calling this function a potential is twofold: firstly, it is the nonatomic
generalisation of the potential function introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996)
to describe finite congestion games; secondly, the payoff functions ωiα can be ob-
tained from Φ by a simple differentiation. To be sure, if we set F (x) = Φ(y) where
y = P (x), we readily obtain:
(2.20)
∂F
∂xiα
=
∑
r
∂Φ
∂yr
∂yr
∂xiα
=
∑
r
φr(yr)P
i
rα =
∑
r∈α φr(yr) = ωiα(x),
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which is exactly the definition of a potential function in the sense of (2.7) – note
also that the “externality symmetry” condition (2.6) can be verified independently:
(2.21)
∂ωiα
∂xjβ
=
∑
r
P irαφ
′
r(yr)P
j
rβ =
∑
r∈α∩β φ
′
r(yr) =
∂ωjβ
∂xiα
.
To describe the exact relation between Wardrop flows and the minima of Φ,
consider the (convex) set P (∆) of all load profiles y that result from admissible
flows x ∈ ∆. Since the latency functions φr are increasing, Φ will be strictly convex
over P (∆) and it will thus have a unique (global) minimum y∗ ∈ P (∆). Amaz-
ingly enough, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that characterise this minimum coincide
with the Wardrop condition (2.9) (Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten, 1956; Dafer-
mos and Sparrow, 1969; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002; Sandholm, 2001), so the
Wardrop set of the congestion model C will be given by:
(2.22) ∆∗ = {x ∈ ∆ : P (x) = y∗} = P−1(y∗) ∩∆.
Proposition 2.5. Let C ≡ C(Q, φr) be a congestion model with strictly increas-
ing latencies φr and let ∆∗ be its set of Wardrop equilibria. Then:
1. any two Wardrop flows exhibit equal loads and delays.
2. ∆∗ is a nonempty convex polytope with dim(∆∗) ≤ red(Q); moreover, if there
exists an interior equilibrium q ∈ Int(∆), then dim(∆∗) = red(Q).
Since P−1(y∗) is an affine subspace of RA and ∆ is a product of simplices, there
is really nothing left to prove (simply observe that if q is an interior Wardrop flow,
then P−1(y∗) intersects the full-dimensional interior of ∆). The only surprise here is
that this result seems to have been overlooked in much of the literature concerning
congestion models: for instance, both Sandholm (2001, Corollary 5.6) and Fischer
and Vöcking (2004, Propositions 2 and 3) presume that Wardrop equilibria are
unique in networks with increasing latencies. However, if there are two distinct
flows x, x′ leading to the same load profile y (e.g. as in the simple network of
Fig. 1(b)), then the potential function F (x) ≡ Φ(P (x)) is no longer strictly convex:
it is in fact constant along every null direction of the redundancy matrix Q = P |T∆.
We thus see that a Wardrop equilibrium is unique iff a) the network Q is irre-
ducible, or b) P−1(y∗) only intersects ∆ at a vertex. This last condition suggests
that the vertices of ∆ play a special role so, in analogy with Nash games, we define:
Definition 2.6. A Wardrop equilibrium q will be called strict if a) q is pure:
q =
∑
i ρiei,αi , αi ∈ Ai; and b) ωiαi(q) < ωiβ(q) for all paths β ∈ Ai \{αi}.
In Nash games, a pure equilibrium occasionally fails to be strict, but only by a
hair: an arbitrarily small perturbation of a player’s pure payoffs ui;α1,...αN resolves a
pure equilibrium into a strict one without affecting the payoffs of the other players.
In congestion models however, there is no such guarantee because, whenever two
users’ paths overlap, one cannot perturb the delays of one user independently of the
other’s. As a matter of fact, the existence of a strict Wardrop equilibrium actually
precludes the existence of any other equilibria:
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Proposition 2.7. Let C be a congestion model. If q is a strict Wardrop equi-
librium of C, then q is the unique Wardrop equilibrium of C.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let q =
∑
i ρiei,0 be a strict Wardrop equi-
librium of C and suppose ad absurdum that q′ 6= q is another Wardrop flow. If we
set z = q′ − q ∈ kerQ, it follows that the convex combinations q + θz will also be
Wardrop for all θ ∈ [0, 1]; moreover, for small enough θ > 0, q+ θz employs at least
one path µ ∈ Ai \{0} that is not present in q (recall that q is pure). As a result,
we get ωiµ(q + θz) = ωi,0(q + θz) for all sufficiently small θ > 0, and because the
latency functions ωiα are continuous, this yields ωi,0(q) = ωiµ(q). However, since
q is a strict Wardrop equilibrium which does not employ µ, we must also have
ωi,0(q) < ωiµ(q), a contradiction.
In other words, even if q is a strict equilibrium of a reducible network, then
the redundant directions which constitute the affine subspace q + kerQ will only
intersect ∆ at q. On the other hand, if q is merely a pure equilibrium, q + kerQ
might well intersect the open interior of ∆; in that case, there is no arbitrarily small
perturbation of the delay functions that could make q into a strict equilibrium.
Equilibria and Objectives. On account of the above, we will focus our investigations
on the concept of Wardrop equilibrium. However, we should mention here that
this equilibrial notion can also be reconciled (to some extent at least) with the
optimisation objectives represented by the payoffs (2.17) and (2.18) as well.
First, with respect to the average delays ωi(x) = ρ−1i
∑i
α xiαωiα(x), the optimal
traffic distributions which minimise the aggregate delay ω(x) =
∑
i ρiωi(x) coin-
cide with the Wardrop equilibria of a suitably modified game. This was first noted
by Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten (1956), who observed the inherent duality
in Wardrop’s principle: just as Wardrop equilibria occur at the minimum of the
Rosenthal potential, so can one obtain the minimum of the aggregate latency ω by
looking at the Wardrop equilibria of an associated congestion model. More precisely,
the only change that needs to be made is to consider the “marginal” latency func-
tions φ∗r(yr) = φr(yr) + yrφ′r(yr) (see also Roughgarden and Tardos, 2004). Then,
to study these “socially optimal” flows, we simply have to redress our analysis to fit
these “marginal latencies” instead (see Section 5 for more details).
Secondly, Wardrop equilibria also have close ties with the Nash condition (NE2)
which corresponds to the “worst-delays” (2.18). Specifically, one can easily see that
the Nash condition (NE2) is equivalent to the Wardrop condition (2.9) when every
user only has 2 possible paths to choose from (every amount of traffic diverted from
one path increases the delay at the user’s other path). However, if a user has 3 or
more paths at his disposal, then the situation can change dramatically because of
Braess’s paradox (Braess, 1968).
The essence of this paradox is that there exist networks which perform better
if one removes their fastest link. An example of such a network is given in Fig. 2,
where it is assumed that a user seeks to route 6 units of traffic from A to D using
the three paths A → B → D (blue), A → C → D (red) and A → B → C → D
(green). In that case, the Wardrop condition (WEQ) calls for equidistribution: 2
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A
B
C
D
10x
50 + x
50 + x
10x
10 + x
Fig 2. Braess’s paradox and the disparity between Wardrop and Nash equilibria.
units are routed via each path, leading to a delay of 92 time units along all paths.
Alternatively, if the user sends 3 traffic units via the red and blue paths and ignores
the green one, all traffic will experience a delay of 83. Paradoxically, even though
the green path has a latency of only 70, the Nash conditon (NE2) is satisfied: if
traffic is diverted from, say, the red path to the faster green one, then the latency
of the blue path will also increase, thus increasing the worst delay ω˜i as well.
This paradox is what led to the original investigations in the efficiency of selfish
routing (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002),
and it seems that it is also what causes this disparity between Wardrop and Nash
equilibria. A thorough investigation of this matter is a worthy project but, since it
would take us too far afield, we will not pursue it here. Henceforward, we will focus
almost exclusively on Wardrop flows, which represent the most relevant equilibrium
concept for our purposes.
3. Learning, Evolution and Rational Behaviour. Unfortunately, locating
the Wardrop equilibria of a network is a rather arduous process which entails a
good deal of global calculations (namely the minimisation of a nonlinear convex
functional with exponentially many variables over a convex polytope). Since such
calculations clearly exceed the deductive capabilities of individual users (especially
if they do not have access to global information), it is of great interest to see whether
there are simple learning schemes which allow users to reach an equilibrium without
having to rely on centralised computations.
3.1. Learning and the Replicator Dynamics. For our purposes, a learning scheme
will be a rule which trains users to route their traffic in an efficient way by process-
ing information that is readily available. On the other hand, since this information
must be “local” in nature, the learning scheme should be similarly “distributed”: for
example, the play of one’s opponents or the exact form of the network’s latency
functions are not easily accessible pieces of information. Furthermore, we should
also be looking for a learning scheme which is simple enough for users to apply in
real-time, without having to perform a huge number of calculations at each instant.
In continuous time, such a learning scheme may be cast as a dynamical system:
(3.1)
dx
dt
= v(x) or, in coordinates:
dxiα
dt
= viα(x),
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where x(t) ∈ ∆ denotes the flow at time t and the vector field v : ∆ → RA plays
the part of the “learning rule” in question – for simplicity, we will also take v to be
smooth. Of course, since the flow x(t) evolves in ∆, v itself must lie on the tangent
space Z of ∆; we thus require that
∑i
α viα(x) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Furthermore, v should also leave the faces of ∆ invariant in the sense that any
individual trajectory xi(t) that begins at some face of ∆i must always remain in
said face. This is actually an essential consequence of our postulates: if a user does
not employ a particular route α ∈ Ai, then he has no information on the route and,
as such, there is no a priori reason that an adaptive learning rule would induce the
user to sample it. In effect, such a learning rule would either fail to rely solely on
readily observable information or would not necessarily be a very simple one.
This shows that viα(x) must vanish if xiα = 0, so if we set viα(x) = xiαv˜iα(x),
we obtain the orthogonality condition
∑i
α xiαv˜iα(x) = 0. Accordingly, v˜iα may be
written in the form:
(3.2) v˜iα(x) = uiα(x)− ui(x)
where the uiα satisfy no further constraints and, as can be shown by a simple
summation, the function ui(x) is just the user average: ui(x) = ρ−1i
∑i
β xiβuiβ(x)
(recall that
∑i
β xiβ = ρi). This shows that any learning rule which leaves the faces
of ∆ invariant must necessarily be of the form:
(3.3)
dxiα
dt
= xiα (uiα(x)− ui(x)) .
Dynamics of this type were first derived in the context of population biology by
Taylor and Jonker (1978), initially for different genotypes within a species (single-
population models), and then for different species altogether (multi-population
models; Weibull (1995) provides an excellent survey). In these evolutionary games,
the key objects of interest are large populations of different species, each of them
subdivided into distinct genotypes that are “programmed” to a specific behaviour
(e.g. “hawks” fight, while “doves” take flight). Then, at each instance of biological
interaction, it is assumed that one representative from each species is selected at
random, and they are all matched to play some Nash game G whose payoffs repre-
sent a proportionate increase in their reproductive fitness (measured by the number
of offsprings in the unit of time). In this fashion, if uiα(x) denotes the population
average of the payoff to the α-th genotype, it turns out that the evolution of the
species will be governed by the replicator dynamics (3.3).
In our case, the most natural choice for the payoffs uiα of (3.3) is to use the
delay functions ωiα(x) and set uiα = −ωiα. In so doing, we obtain:
(3.4)
dxiα
dt
= xiα (ωi(x)− ωiα(x)) .
In keeping with our “local information” mantra, we see that users do not need to
know the delays along paths that they do not employ because the replicator vector
field vanishes when xiα = 0. Thus, users that evolve according to (3.4) are oblivious
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to their surroundings, even to the existence of other users: they simply use (3.4) to
respond to the stimuli ωiα(x) in the hope of minimising their delays.
Alternatively, if players learn at different rates λi > 0 as a result of varied
stimulus-response characteristics, we obtain the rate-adjusted dynamics:
(3.5)
dxiα
dt
= λixiα (ωi(x)− ωiα(x))
(naturally, the uniform case (3.4) is recovered when all players learn at the “stan-
dard” rate λi = 1). Interestingly enough, these learning rates can also be viewed as
(player-specific) inverse temperatures: in high temperatures (small λi), the differ-
ences between routes are toned down and players evolve along the slow time-scales
λit; at the other end of the spectrum, if λi →∞, equation (3.5) “freezes” to a rigid
(and myopic) best-reply process (see also Börgers and Sarin, 1997).
3.2. Entropy and Rationality. An immediate observation concerning the repli-
cator dynamics (3.5) is that Wardrop equilibria are rest points: if q is a Wardrop
flow, the characterisation (WEQ′) gives ωiα(q) = ωi(q) whenever xiα > 0. How-
ever, the same holds for all flows q′ which exhibit equal latencies along the paths
in their support, and these flows are not necessarily Wardrop (in the terminology
of Sandholm (2001), this means that the replicator dynamics are “complacent”).
Consequently, the issue at hand is whether or not the replicator dynamics manage
to single out Wardrop equilibria among other stationary states.
In that direction, if y∗ is the minimum of the Rosenthal potential Φ(y), it is
easy to see that the function F0(x) = Φ(P (x))−Φ(y∗) is a semi-definite Lyapunov
function for the dynamics (3.5). Indeed, F0 vanishes on the Wardrop set ∆∗, is
positive otherwise, and its evolution under (3.5) satisfies:
(3.6)
dF0
dt
=
∑
i,α
∂Fiα
∂xiα
dxiα
dt
=
∑
i
λiρi
[
ω2i (x)− ρ−1i
(∑i
α
xiαω
2
iα(x)
)]
≤ 0,
the last step following from Jensen’s inequality – equality only holds when ωiα(x) =
ωi(x) for all α ∈ supp(x). Thus, by standard results in the theory of dynamical
systems, it follows that the solution orbits of (3.5) descend the potential F0 and
eventually converge to a connected subset of rest points – see also Sandholm (2001),
where the property (3.6) is referred to as “positive correlation”.
Nevertheless, since not all stationary points of (3.5) are Wardrop equilibria, this
result tells us little about the rationality properties of the replicator dynamics in
congestion models. A much more important role is played by the relative entropy
(also known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence):
(3.7) Hq(x) ≡ dKL(q, x) =
∑
α∈supp(q)
qiα log
qiα
xiα
where the sum is taken over the support of q: supp(q) = {α : qiα > 0}. Of course,
this sum is finite only when x employs with positive probability all α ∈ A that are
present in q; that is, the domain of definition of Hq is ∆q ≡ {x ∈ ∆ : q  x} (here,
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“” denotes absolute continuity of measures). Even so though, it will matter little
if we extend Hq continuously to all of ∆ by setting Hq =∞ outside ∆q, so we will
occasionally act as if Hq were defined over all of ∆.
Technicalities aside, the significance of the relative entropy lies in that it measures
distance in probability space. Indeed, even though it is not a distance function per
se (it fails to be symmetric and does not satisfy the triangle inequality), it is positive
definite (see below) and strictly convex (Weibull, 1995). More importantly for our
purposes, it is also a (semi-definite) Lyapunov function for the dynamics (3.4):
Lemma 3.1. Let C(Q, {φr}) be a congestion model with increasing latencies,
and let q ∈ ∆ be a Wardrop flow of C. Then, the relative entropy Hq(x) satisfies:
1. Hq(q) = 0 and Hq(x) > 0 for all x 6= q;
2. H˙q vanishes on the Wardrop set ∆∗(C) and is negative otherwise (where H˙q
denotes the time derivative with respect to (3.4): H˙q =
∑
i,α
∂Hq
∂xiα
x˙iα).
In particular, if the network Q is irreducible (red(Q) = 0), then Hq is Lyapunov for
the replicator dynamics (3.4).
Proof. The first part of the lemma (positive-definiteness) is an easy conse-
quence of Jensen’s inequality (Weibull, 1995, pp. 95–100). As for the second part:
(3.8) H˙q(x) =
∑
i,α
∂Hq
∂xiα
x˙iα = −
∑
i,α
qiα (ωi(x)− ωiα(x)) ≡ −Lq(x),
where we have set Lq(x) ≡
∑i
α qiα(ωi(x)−ωiα(x)). Then, the simple rearrangement∑i
α qiαωi(x) = ρiωi(x) =
∑i
α xiαωiα(x) and some trivial linear algebra yield:
(3.9) Lq(x) ≡
∑
i,α
(xiα − qiα)ωiα(x) =
∑
r
(yr − y∗r )φr(yr) ≡ Λ(y),
where y = P (x) and y∗ = P (q) are the load profiles which correspond to the flows
x and q respectively.
We will refer to the expression Lq (or, interchangeably, to Λ) as the adjoint poten-
tial of C because, similarly to the Rosenthal potential Φ, it measures distance from
the Wardrop set ∆∗. The properties of Lq will be discussed at length in Appendix
A where, among others, we establisth the easy (but crucial!) inequality:
(3.10) Λ(y) ≥ Φ(y)− Φ(y∗).
Hence, with y∗ being the global minimum of Φ, we conclude that Λ is positive
definite and the lemma follows by noting that P (x) = y∗ iff x is Wardrop.
Remark 1 (The Rate-adjusted Case). It is also reasonable to ask whether the
relative entropy function enjoys the same properties in the rate-adjusted dynamics
(3.5). Unfortunately, this is not true unless all players learn at the same rate;
however, if we consider the rate-adjusted relative entropy:
(3.11) Hq(x;λ) =
∑
i∈N
λ−1i
∑
α:qiα>0
qiα log
qiα
xiα
,
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the same calculations show that H˙q(x;λ) = −Lq(x) and provide us with the ana-
logue of Lemma 3.1 for the rate-adjusted dynamics (3.5).
In view of the above, it would be tempting to infer that the replicator dynamics
converge to Wardrop equilibrium. Nevertheless, a semi-definite Lyapunov function
is not enough to guarantee convergence by itself, even if we rule out the existence
of limit cycles. For instance, if we consider the homogeneous system:
(3.12) x˙ = yz, y˙ = −xz, z˙ = −z2,
with z ≥ 0, we see that it admits the semi-definite Lyapunov function H(x, y, z) =
x2 + y2 + z2 whose time derivative only vanishes on the x-y plane. However, the
general solution of (3.12) in cylindrical coordinates (ρ, φ, z) is just:
(3.13) ρ(t) = ρ0, φ(t) = φ0 − log(1 + z0t), z(t) = z0
1 + z0t
,
and this represents a helix of constant radius whose coils become topologically
dense as the solution orbits approach the x-y plane. We thus see that the solutions
of (3.12) approach a set of stationary points, but do not converge to a specific one.
That said, there is much more at work in the replicator dynamics (3.5) than a
single semi-definite Lyapunov function: there exists a whole family of such functions,
one for each Wardrop flow q ∈ ∆. So, undettered by potential pathologies, the
replicator dynamics actually do converge to equilibrium:
Theorem 3.2. Let C(Q, {φr}) be a congestion model in a network Q. Then,
every interior solution trajectory of the replicator dynamics (3.5) converges to a
Wardrop equilibrium of C; in particular, if the network Q is irreducible, x(t) con-
verges to the unique Wardrop equilibrium of C.
Proof. It will be useful to shift our point of view to the evolution function
θ(x, t) of the dynamics (3.5) which describes the solution trajectory that starts at
x at time t = 0 and which satisfies the consistency condition:
(3.14) θ(x, t+ s) = θ(θ(x, t), s) for all t, s ≥ 0 and for all x ∈ ∆.
Now, fix the initial condition x ∈ Int(∆) and let x(t) = θ(x, t) be the corresponding
solution orbit. If q ∈ ∆∗ is a Wardrop equilibrium of C, then, in view of Lemma
3.1, the function Vq(t) ≡ Hq(θ(x, t)) will be decreasing and will converge to some
m ≥ 0 as t→∞. It thus follows that x(t) converges itself to the level set H−1q (m).
Suppose now that there exists some increasing sequence of times tn → ∞ such
that xn ≡ x(tn) does not converge to ∆∗. By compactness of ∆ (and by descending
to a subsequence if necessary), we may assume that xn = θ(x, tn) converges to some
x∗ /∈ ∆∗ (but necessarily in H−1q (m)). Hence, for any t > 0:
(3.15) Hq(θ(x, tn + t)) = Hq(θ(θ(x, tn), t))→ Hq(θ(x∗, t)) < Hq(x∗) = m
where the (strict) inequality stems from the fact that H˙q < 0 outside ∆∗. On the
other hand, Hq(θ(x, tn + t)) = Vq(tn + t)→ m, a contradiction.
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q
∆
∆∗
H−1q (m)
Fig 3. The various sets in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Since the sequence tn was arbitrary, this shows x(t) converges to the set ∆∗. So,
let q′ be a limit point of x(t) with x(t′n)→ q′ for some sequence of times t′n →∞.
Then, Vq′(t′n) = Hq′(x(t′n)) will converge to zero and, with Vq′ decreasing, we will
have limt→∞ Vq′(t) = 0 as well. Seeing as Hq′ only vanishes at q′, we conclude that
x(t)→ q′.
Remark 1 (Previous Work). In the context of potential games, Sandholm
(2001) examined a class of learning dynamics viα which are “positively correlated”
to the game’s payoff functions uiα = −ωiα, in the sense that
∑
i,α viα(x)ωiα(x) ≥ 0.
It was then shown that if the rest points of these dynamics coincide with the game’s
Wardrop equilibria (the “non-complacency” condition), then all solution orbits con-
verge to set of Wardrop equilibria. Unfortunately, as we have already pointed out,
the replicator dynamics are “complacent” and, in that case, Sandholm’s results only
ensure that Wardrop equilibria are Lyapunov stable.
To the best of our knowledge, the stronger convergence properties of Theorem
3.2 were first suggested by Fischer and Vöcking (2004) who identified the link be-
tween Wardrop equilibrium and evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith, 1974). In
particular, the authors showed that Wardrop equilibria are robust against “muta-
tions” that lead to greater delays but, in networks with more than one users (the
“multi-commodity” case as they call it), their approach rests heavily on the (im-
plicit) assumption of irreducibility. If this is not the case, the adjoint potential Lq
is only positive semi-definite and the approach of Fischer and Vöcking breaks down
because Wardrop equilibria are only neutrally stable – this is also the problem with
the formulation of Corrolary 5.1 in Sandholm (2001).
Remark 2 (Non-interior Trajectories). One might also ask what happens if
the initial condition x(0) is not an interior point of ∆. Clearly, if x(0) does not
employ the routes that are present in a Wardrop flow q, x(t) cannot have q as a
limit point – a simple consequence of the fact that the replicator dynamics leave
the faces of ∆ invariant. All the same, one can simply quotient out the routes that
are not initially present until x(0) becomes an interior point in the reduced strategy
space ∆eff that ensues. In that case, Theorem 3.2 can be applied to the (similarly
reduced) congestion model Ceff to show that x(t) converges to Wardrop equilibrium
in Ceff (cf. the “restricted equilibria” of Fischer and Vöcking, 2004).
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Remark 3 (Evolution and Friction). Since the replicator trajectories converge
to a Wardrop equilibrium, it follows that there can be no limit cycles. On the
other hand, limit cycles are a common occurence in evolutionary games: for ex-
ample, Mathcing Pennies and Rock-Paper-Scissors both exhibit limit cycles in the
standard replicator dynamics (Weibull, 1995). So, while the evolutionary energy
of large populations may remain undiminished over time, Theorem 3.2 shows that
congestion models are dissipative and traffic flows settle down to a steady state.
4. The Effect of Stochastic Fluctuations. Going back to our original dis-
cussion on learning schemes, we see that the users’ evolution hinges on the feedback
that they receive about their choices, namely the delays ωiα(x) that they record.
We have already noted that this information is based on actual observations, but
this does not necessarily mean that it is also accurate as well. For instance, the
interference of nature with the game or imperfect readings of one’s payoffs might
perturb this information considerably; additionally, if the users’ traffic flows are
not continuous in time but consist of discrete segments instead (e.g. datagrams
in communication networks), the queueing latencies ωiα only represent the users’
expected delays. Hence, the delays that users actually observe might only be a
randomly fluctuating estimate of the underlying payoffs, and this could negatively
affect the rationality properties of the replicator dynamics.
4.1. Stochastic Replicator Dynamics. Our goal here will be to determine the
behaviour of the replicator dynamics under stochastic perturbations of the kind
outlined above. To that end, write the delay that users experience along the edge
r ∈ E as φˆr = φr + ηr where ηr denotes the perturbation process. Then, the
latency ωˆiα along α ∈ Ai will just be ωˆiα = ωiα + ηiα, where, in obvious notation,
ηiα =
∑
α P
i
rαηr. In this way, the replicator dynamics (3.4) become:
(4.1)
dxiα
dt
= xiα (ωˆi − ωˆiα) = xiα (ωi − ωiα) + xiα(ηi − ηiα)
where ωˆi = ρ−1i
∑i
β xiβωˆiβ and ηi = ρ
−1
i
∑i
β xiβηiβ .
The exact form of the perturbations ηr clearly depends on the particular situation
at hand. Still, since we are chiefly interested in stochastic fluctuations around the
underlying delays ωiα, it is reasonable to take these perturbations to be some sort
of white noise that does not bias users towards one direction or another. In that
case, we should rewrite (4.1) as a stochastic differential equation:
(4.2) dXiα = Xiα [ωi(X)− ωiα(X)] dt+Xiα
[
dUiα − ρ−1i
∑i
β
Xiβ dUiβ
]
where dUiα describes the total noise along the path α ∈ Ai:
(4.3) dUiα =
∑
r∈α σr dWr =
∑
r
P irασr dWr
and W (t) =
∑
rWr(t)εr is a Wiener process in RE, the space spanned by the edges
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E of the network. Similarly, if players learn at different rates λi, we get:
dXiα = λiXiα [ωi(X)− ωiα(X)] + λiXiα
[
dUiα − ρ−1i
∑i
β
Xiβ dUiβ
]
(4.4)
= λibiα(X)dt+ λi
∑i
β
ci,αβ(X) dUiβ
where b and c are the drift and diffusion coefficients that appear in (4.2).
The rate-adjusted equation (4.4) will constitute our stochastic version of the
replicator dynamics and, as such, it warrants some discussion in and by itself. A
first remark to be made concerns the noise coefficients σr: even though we have
written them in a form that suggests they are constant, they need not be so: after
all, the intensity of the noise on an edge might well depend on the edge loads
Yr =
∑
α PrαXα. On that account, we will only assume that these coefficients
are essentially bounded functions of the loads y. Nonetheless, in an effort to reduce
notational clutter, we will not indicate this dependence explicitly; instead, we simply
remark here that our results continue to hold if we replace σr with the worst-case
scenario σr ↔ ess supy σr(y).
Secondly, it is also important to compare (4.4) to other stochastic incarnations
of the replicator dynamics, namely the “aggregate shocks” version of Fudenberg and
Harris (1992) and the authors’ own “exponential learning” approach (Mertikopou-
los and Moustakas, 2009a,b). In the case of the former, one perturbs the replicator
equation (3.3) by accounting for the (stochastic) interference of nature with repro-
duction rates (Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; Imhof, 2005):
dXiα = Xiα (uiα(X)− ui(X)) dt−
(
σ2iαXiα −
∑i
β
σ2iβXiβ
)
dt(4.5)
+Xiα
[
σiα dWiα −
∑i
β
σiβXiβ dWiβ
]
,
where W =
∑
i,αWiαeiα is a Wiener process in
∏
iRAi . Then, if the “aggregate
shocks” σiα are mild enough, Cabrales (2000) and Imhof (2005) showed that dom-
inated strategies become extinct and that the game’s strict Nash equilibria are
asymptotically stable with arbitrarily high probability.
By comparison, in the “exponential learning” case it is assumed that the players
of a Nash game employ a learning scheme akin to logistic fictitious play (Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998, pp. 118–129). However, if the information that players have is
imperfect, the errors propagate to their learning curves and instead lead to the
stochastic dynamics:
dXiα = λiXiα [(uiα(X)− ui(X))] dt+ λiXiα
[
σiαdWiα −
∑i
β
σiβXiβdWiβ
]
(4.6)
+
λ2i
2
Xiα
[
σ2iα(1− 2Xiα)−
∑i
β
σ2iβXiβ(1− 2Xiβ)
]
dt.
The rationality properties of these learning dynamics are somewhat stronger than
in the biological setting: irrespective of the perturbations’ magnitude, strategies
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which are not rationally admissible die out at an exponential rate and the strict
Nash equilibria of the game are always (stochastically) stable (Mertikopoulos and
Moustakas, 2009a,b).
In light of the above, there are two notable traits of (4.4) that set it apart
from its other stochastic versions. First off, the drift of (4.4) coincides with the
deterministic replicator dynamics (3.5) whereas the drift coefficients of (4.5) and
(4.6) do not. On the other hand, the martingale processes U that appear in (4.4)
are not uncorrelated components of some Wiener process (as is the case for both
(4.5) and (4.6)): instead, depending on whether the paths α, β ∈ A have edges in
common or not, the processes Uα, Uβ might be highly correlated or not at all.
To make this last observation more precise, recall that the Wiener differentials
dWr are orthogonal: dWr · dWs = d[Wr,Ws] = δrs dt. In its turn, this implies that
the stochastic differentials dUα, dUβ satisfy:
dUα · dUβ =
(∑
r
Prασr dWr
)
·
(∑
s
Psβσs dWs
)
(4.7)
=
∑
r,s
PrαPsβσrσsδrs dt =
∑
r∈αβ σ
2
r dt = σ
2
αβ dt,
where σ2αβ =
∑
r PrαPrβσ
2
r gives the variance of the noise along the intersection
αβ ≡ α∩β of the paths α, β ∈ A (note also that we used our notational conventions
to avoid cumbersome expressions such as σ2iα,jβ). We thus see that the processes
Uα and Uβ are uncorrelated iff the paths α, β ∈ A have no common edges. At the
other extreme, we have:
(4.8) (dUα)
2
=
∑
r∈α σ
2
r dt = σ
2
α dt
where σ2α ≡ σ2αα =
∑
r Prασ
2
r measures the intensity of the noise on the route
α ∈ A.1 These expressions will be key to our analysis and we will make liberal use
of them in the rest of our paper.
4.2. Stochastic Fluctuations and Rationality. Our goal in this section will be
to explore the rationality properties of the stochastic replicator dynamics (4.4).
To begin with, note that (4.4) admits a (unique) strong solution for any initial
state X(0) = x ∈ ∆, even though its coefficients do not necessarily grow linearly
– a common requisite for existence and uniqueness of strong solutions to SDE’s.
Indeed, an addition over α ∈ Ai reveals that every component simplex ∆i of ∆
remains invariant under these dynamics: if Xi(0) = xi ∈ ∆i, then d (
∑
αXiα) = 0
and, hence, Xi(t) stays in ∆i for all t ≥ 0. So, if U ⊇ ∆ is open and φ is a smooth
bump function on U that vanishes outside some compact set K ⊇ U , the SDE
(4.9) dXiα = λiφ(x)
(
biα(X) dt+
∑i
β
ci,αβ(X) dUiβ
)
has bounded coefficients and will thus admit a unique strong solution. But since
this last equation agrees with (4.4) on ∆ and all solutions of (4.4) always stay in
∆, our claim follows.
1This notation is also consistent with our intersection notation: αα ≡ α ∩ α = α.
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Now, as in the deterministic setting, our main tool will be the (rate-adjusted)
relative entropy Hq(x;λ) =
∑
i λ
−1
i
∑i
α qiα log (qiα/xiα) which we will study with
the help of the generator L of the diffusion (4.4). To that end, recall that the
generator L of the Itô diffusion:
(4.10) dXα(t) = µα(X(t)) dt+
∑
β
σαβ(X(t)) dWβ(t),
where W is a Wiener process, is just the second order differential operator:
(4.11) L =
∑
α
µα(x)
∂
∂xα
+
1
2
∑
α,β
(
σ(x)σT (x)
)
αβ
∂2
∂xα∂xβ
(for a comprehensive account, consult the excellent book by Øksendal (2007)). In
this manner, if f is a sufficiently smooth function, Lf captures the drift of the
process f(X(t)):
(4.12) df(X(t)) = Lf(X(t)) dt+
∑
α,β
∂f
∂xα
∣∣∣∣
X(t)
σαβ(X(t)) dWβ(t).
Of course, in the case of the diffusion (4.4), the martingales U are not the compo-
nents of a Wiener process, so (4.12) cannot be applied right off the shelf. However,
a straightforward application of Itô’s lemma (see appendix B) yields:
Lemma 4.1. Let L be the generator of (4.4). Then, for any q ∈ ∆:
LHq(x;λ) = −Lq(x) + 1
2
∑
i
λi
ρi
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγ(xiβ − qiβ)(xiγ − qiγ)(4.13)
+
1
2
∑
i
λi
ρi
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγqiβ(ρiδβγ − qiγ),
where Lq(x) =
∑
iα(xiα − qiα)ωiα(x) is the adjoint potential of (3.9).
In a certain sense, this lemma can be viewed as the stochastic analogue of Lemma
3.1 (which is recovered immediately if we set σ = 0). However, it also shows that the
stochastic situation is much more intricate than the deterministic one. For example,
if q is a Wardrop equilibrium, (4.13) gives:
(4.14) LHq(q;λ) =
1
2
∑
i
λi
ρi
∑i
β,γ
qiβ (ρiδβγ − qiγ)σ2βγ ,
and if we focus on user i ∈ N, we readily obtain:∑i
β,γ
qiβ (ρiδβγ − qiγ)σ2βγ =
∑i
β,γ
qiβ(ρiδβγ − qiγ)
∑
r
P irβP
i
rγσ
2
r(4.15)
=
∑
r
σ2rρiyir −
∑
r
σ2ry
2
ir =
∑
r
σ2ryir(ρi − yir),
where yir =
∑
r P
i
rαqiα ≤ ρi is the load induced on edge r ∈ E by the i-th user.
This shows that (4.14) is positive if at least one user mixes his routes, thus ruling
out negative definiteness (even semi-definiteness) for LHq.
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In view of the above, unconditional convergence to Wardrop equilibrium appears
to be a “bridge too far” in our stochastic environment, especially when the equilib-
rium in question is not pure – after all, mixed equilibria are not even traps of (4.4).
This leads us to the notion of stochastic stability :
Definition 4.2 (Arnold, 1974; Gikhman and Skorokhod, 1971). We will say
that q ∈ Rn is stochastically asymptotically stable with respect to the process X(t)
when, for every neighbourhood U of q and every ε > 0, there exists a neighbourhood
V of q such that:
(4.16) Px
{
X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0 and lim
t→∞X(t) = q
}
≥ 1− ε.
for all initial conditions X(0) = x ∈ V .
As we mentioned before, the notion of stochastic stability features prominently
in the analysis of stochastically perturbed evolutionary or Nash-type games because
it is precisely the type of stability that the strict equilibria of these games exhibit
(Imhof, 2005; Mertikopoulos and Moustakas, 2009a). Motivated by these results, we
are finally in a position to state our analogue of the folk theorem for stochastically
perturbed congestion models:
Theorem 4.3. Strict Wardrop equilibria are stochastically asymptotically stable
in the replicator dynamics (4.4).
Proof. By relabeling indices if necessary, assume that q =
∑
i ρiei,0 is the strict
Wardrop equilibrium of C. Inspired by the deterministic setting and the original
idea of Imhof (2005), we will show that Hq is a local stochastic Lyapunov function,
i.e. that LHq(x) ≤ −kHq(x) for some k > 0 and for all x sufficiently close to q.
Our result will then follow from Theorem 4 in Gikhman and Skorokhod (1971, pp.
314–315).
To that end, consider a perturbed flow x =
∑
i,α xiαqiα close to q:
(4.17) xi,0 = ρi(1− εi), xiµ = εiξiµ for µ = 1, 2 . . . ∈ Ai \{0}
where εi > 0 controls the L1 distance between xi and qi, and ξi is a point in the
face of ∆i lying opposite to q (i.e. ξiµ ≥ 0 and
∑
µ ξiµ = ρi). Then, in view of
Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, the adjoint potential Lq will be bounded below by:
(4.18) Lq(x) ≥
∑
i
ρiεi∆ωi,
where ∆ωi = minµ{ωiµ(q) − ωi,0(q)} > 0 (recall that q is a strict Wardrop equi-
librium). Therefore, since the second term of LHq(x;λ) in (4.13) is clearly of order
O(ε2), we obtain:
(4.19) LHq(x;λ) ≤ −
∑
i
ρiεi∆ωi + O(ε
2)
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where ε2 =
∑
i ε
2
i . On the other hand, we also have:
(4.20) Hq(x;λ) =
∑
i
ρi
λi
log
ρi
xi,0
= −
∑
i
ρi
λi
log(1− εi) =
∑
i
ρi
λi
εi + O(ε
2).
Thus, if we pick some positive k < mini{λi∆ωi}, some elementary algebra gives:
(4.21) LHq(x;λ) ≤ −k
∑
i
ρi
λi
εi + O(ε
2) = −kHq(x;λ) + O(ε2),
thus showing that (4.13) holds whenever ε is small enough.
In other words, Theorem 4.3 implies that trajectories which start sufficiently
close to a strict equilibrium will remain in its vicinity and will eventually converge
to it with arbitrarily high probability. Nonetheless, this is a local result: if the users’
initial traffic distribution is not close to a strict equilibrium itself, Theorem 4.3 does
not apply; specifically, if X(0) is an arbitrary initial condition in ∆, we cannot even
tell if the trajectory X(t) will ever approach q.
To put this in more precise terms, it will be convenient to measure distances in
∆ with the L1-norm: ‖∑α zαeα‖1 = ∑α |zα|. In this norm, it is not too hard to
see that ∆ has a diameter of 2
∑
i ρi, so pick some positive δ < 2
∑
i ρi and let
Kδ = {x ∈ ∆ : ‖x − q‖1 ≤ δ} be the corresponding compact neighbourhood of q.
Then, to see if X(t) ever hits Kδ, we will examine the hitting time τδ:
(4.22) τδ ≡ τKδ = inf{t > 0 : X(t) ∈ Kδ} = inf{t > 0 : ‖X(t)− q‖1 ≤ δ}.
Thereby, our chief concern is this: is the hitting time τδ finite with high probability?
And if it is, is its expected value also finite?
To make our lives easier, let us consider the collective expressions:
ρ =
∑
i
ρi, ∆ω = ρ
−1∑
i
ρi∆ωi(4.23)
σ2 =
∑
r
σ2r , λ = ρ
−1∑
i
ρiλi.
where ∆ωi = minµ6=αi{ωiµ(q) − ωiαi(q)} > 0 is the minimum delay difference
between a user’s equilibrium path αi and his other choices. We then have:
Theorem 4.4. Let q =
∑
i ρieiαi be a strict Wardrop equilibrium of a conges-
tion model C and assume that the users’ learning rates satisfy the condition:
(4.24) λσ2 < ∆ω.
Then, for any δ < 2ρ and any initial condition X(0) = x ∈ ∆ with finite relative
entropy Hq(x;λ) <∞, the hitting time τδ has finite mean:
(4.25) Ex[τδ] ≤ 2Hq(x;λ)
∆ω
2ρ
δ(2ρ− δ) .
BALANCING TRAFFIC IN NETWORKS 27
Proof. As in the case of Theorem 4.3, our proof hinges on the expression:
(4.26) − LHq(x;λ) = Lq(x)− 1
2
∑
i
λi
ρi
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγ(xiβ − qiγ)(xiγ − qiγ),
where q =
∑
i ρiei,0 is the strict equilibrium in question. In particular, set x = q+θz,
where z =
∑
i,α ziαeiα ∈ Tq∆ is the “inward” direction:
(4.27) zi,0 = −ρi, ziµ ≥ 0 for µ = 1, 2 . . . ∈ A∗i ≡ Ai \{0} and
∑
µ ziµ = ρi.
Then, regarding the first term of (4.26), Lemma A.1 in Appendix A readily yields:
(4.28) Lq(q + θz) ≥ Φ(q + θz)− Φ(q) ≥ θ
∑
i
ρi∆ωi for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
In a similar vein, the second term of (4.26) becomes:∑i
β,γ
σ2βγ(xiβ − qiβ)(xiγ − qiγ) = θ2
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγziβziγ(4.29)
= θ2
∑
r
∑i
β,γ
σ2rP
i
rβP
i
rγziβziγ = θ
2
∑
r
σ2rw
2
ir,
where wi = P i(z). Since wir ≤ ρi for all r ∈ E, we then obtain the inequality:
(4.30) − LHq(x;λ) ≥ θ
∑
i
ρi∆ωi − θ
2
2
σ2
∑
i
λiρi = (ρ∆ω)θ − θ
2
2
ρλσ2
where ρ, σ2 and λ,∆ω are the respective aggregates and averages of (4.23).
Suppose now that the rates λi satisfy (4.24), i.e. λσ2 < ∆ω. In that case, the
RHS of (4.30) will be increasing for all θ ∈ [0, 1] and we will have:
(4.31) − LHq(x;λ) ≥ ρ
[
θ∆ω − 1
2
λσ2θ2
]
> 0
for all x with ‖x− q‖1 ≥ θ‖z‖1 = 2θ
∑
i ρi = 2ρθ. So, if ‖x− q‖1 ≥ δ, we get:
(4.32) − LHq(x;λ) ≥ δ
2
∆ω − 1
2
δ2
4ρ2
σ2ρλ ≥ δ
2
∆ω
(
1− δ
2ρ
)
> 0.
Therefore, if Kδ is the compact neighbourhood Kδ = {x ∈ ∆ : ‖x − q‖1 ≤ δ}, we
will have LHq(x) ≤ − δ2∆ω
(
1− δ2ρ
)
< 0 for all x /∈ Kδ. Then, by a simple (but
very useful!) estimate of Durrett (1996, Theorem 5.3 in page 268) we get:
(4.33) Ex[τδ] ≤ 2Hq(x;λ)
∆ω(1− δ/2ρ)
1
δ
.
Recall now that Theorem 4.3 ensures that a trajectory X(t) which starts suf-
ficiently close to a strict equilibrium q will converge to q with arbitrarily high
probability. Therefore, since Theorem 4.4 shows that X(t) will come arbitrarily
close to q in finite time, a tandem application of these two theorems yields:
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Corollary 4.5. If q is a strict equilibrium of C and the players’ learning rates
λi satisfy (4.24), the trajectories X(t) converge to q almost surely.
Of course, if a strict Wardrop equilibrium exists, then it is the unique equilibrium
of the game (Proposition 2.7). In that case, Corollary 4.5 is the stochastic coun-
terpart of Theorem 3.2: if the players’ learning rates are soft enough compared to
the level of the noise, then the solution orbits of the stochastic replicator dynamics
(4.2) converge to a stationary traffic distribution almost surely. A few remarks are
thus in order:
Remark 1 (Temperance and Temperature). Condition (4.24) shows that the
replicator dynamics reward patience: players who take their time in learning the
game manage to weed out the noise and eventually converge to equilibrium. This
begs to be compared with the (inverse) temperature analogy for the learning rates: if
the “learning temperature” T = 1/λ is too low, the players’ learning scheme becomes
very rigid and this intemperance amplifies any random variations in the experienced
delays. On the other hand, when the temperature rises above the threshold Tc =
σ2/∆ω, the stochastic fluctuations are toned down and the deterministic drift draws
users to equilibrium.
Remark 2. Admittedly, the form of (4.25) is a bit opaque for practical pur-
poses. To lighten it up, note that we are only interested in small δ, so the term
2ρ/(2ρ− δ) may be ignored to leading order. Therefore, if we also assume for sim-
plicity that all players learn at the same rate λi = λ, we get:
(4.34) Ex[τδ] ≤ 2h
λ∆ω
ρ
δ
where h = ρ−1
∑
i ρi log(ρi/xi) is the “average” Kullback-Leibler distance between
x and q.
This very rough estimate is pretty illuminating on its own. First and foremost,
it shows that our bound for Ex[τδ] is inversely proportional to the learning rate
λ, much the same as in the deterministic setting where λ essentially rescales time
to λt. Moreover, because ρ and δ are both O(N), one might be tempted to think
that our time estimates are intensive, i.e. independent of N . However, since delays
increase (nonlinearly even) with the aggregate load ρ, the dependence on N is
actually hidden in ∆ω – this also shows that the learning rates λi do not have to
be O (1/|E|)-small in order to satisfy (4.24).
In any event, since strict equilibria do not always exist, we should return to
the generic case of interior equilibria q ∈ Int(∆). We have already seen that these
equilibria are not very well-behaved in stochastic environments: they are not sta-
tionary in (4.4) and (4.15) shows that LHq is actually positive in their vicinity.
Despite all that, if the network Q is irreducible and the users’ learning rates λi are
slow enough, we will see that the replicator dynamics (4.4) admit a finite invariant
measure which concentrates mass around the (unique) equilibrium of C.
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To state this result precisely, a little more groundwork is required. First off, akin
to the case of strict equilibria, it will be convenient to measure distances from q with
a scaled variant of the L1 norm. In particular, let Sq = {z ∈ Tq∆ : q+ z ∈ bd(∆)}.
Since ∆ is convex, any x ∈ ∆ can be uniquely expressed as x = q + θz for some
z ∈ Sq and some θ ∈ [0, 1], so we define the projective distance Θq(x) of x from q
to be:
(4.35) Θq(x) = θ ⇔ x = q + θz for some z ∈ Sq and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Θq is not a bona fide distance function by itself, but it closely resembles the L1
norm: the “projective balls” Bθ = {x : Θq(x) ≤ θ} are rescaled copies of ∆ (Sq is the
“unit sphere” in this picture), and the graph gr(Θq) ≡ {(x, θ) ∈ ∆×R : Θq(x) = θ}
of Θq is simply a cone over the polytope ∆.
In a similar vein, we define the essence of a point q ∈ ∆ to be:
(4.36) ess(q) = ρ−1 min
{‖P (z)‖ : z ∈ Sq},
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the ordinary Euclidean norm and the factor of ρ was included
for scaling purposes. Comparably to red(Q), ess(q) measures redundancy (or rather,
the lack thereof): ess(q) = 0 only if some direction z ∈ Sq is null for P , i.e. only if
Q is reducible.2
We are finally in a position to state and prove:
Theorem 4.6. Let q ∈ Int(∆) be an interior equilibrium of an irreducible con-
gestion model C, and assume that the users’ learning rates satisfy the condition:
(4.37) λ <
4
5
mρκ2
σ2
,where m = inf{φ′r(yr) : r ∈ E, y ∈ P (∆)} and κ = ess(q).
Then, for any interior initial condition X(0) = x ∈ Int(∆), the trajectories X(t)
are recurrent (a.s.) and their time averages are concentrated in a neighbourhood of
q. Specifically, if Θq(·) denotes the projective distance (4.35) from q, then:
(4.38) Ex
[
1
t
∫ t
0
Θ2q(X(s)) ds
]
≤ θ2λ + O (1/t) , where θ2λ =
1
4
(
mρκ2
λσ2
− 1
)−1
.
Accordingly, the transition probabilities of X(t) converge in total variation to an
invariant probability measure pi on ∆ which concentrates mass around q. In partic-
ular, if Bθ = {x ∈ ∆ : Θq(x) ≤ θ} is a “projective ball” around q, we have:
(4.39) pi(Bθ) ≥ 1− θ2λ/θ2.
Following Bhattacharya (1978), recurrence here means that for every ξ ∈ Int(∆)
and every neighbourhood Uξ of ξ, the diffusion X(t) has the property:
(4.40) Px{X(tk) ∈ Uξ} = 1,
2With some trivial modifications, these definitions can be extended to points in bd(∆) as well.
In particular, if q is strict we get Θqi (xi) = ‖zi‖1/2ρi and, as a consequence of Proposition 2.7,
we will have ess(q) > 0 irrespective of whether Q is reducible or not.
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(a) Learning in an irreducible network.
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(b) Learning in a reducible network.
Fig 4. Learning in the networks of Figure 1 with M/M/1 latency functions φr(yr) = (µr−yr)−1
and arbitrarily chosen capacities µr. The shades of gray represent the invariant distribution of
(4.4) (obtained by numerical simulations) and the flow lines (blue) are the solution trajectories
of (3.5) – in (b) they are actually projections because there is a third user as well.
for some sequence of (random) times tk that increases to infinity. Hence, using the
recurrence criteria of Bhattacharya (1978), we will prove our claim by showing that
X(t) hits a compact neighbourhood of q in finite time (this is the hard part), and
that the generator of a suitably transformed process is elliptic.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. As we mentioned before, any x ∈ ∆ may be (uniquely)
written in the “projective” form x = q + θz, where θ = Θq(x) ∈ [0, 1] is the projec-
tive distance of x from q, and z is a point in the “sphere” Sq = {z′ ∈ Tq∆ : q+ z′ ∈
bd(∆)}. In this manner, (4.13) becomes:
−LHq(x;λ) = Lq(q + θz)− 1
2
∑
i
λi
ρi
θ2
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγziβziγ(4.41)
− 1
2
∑
i
λi
ρi
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγqiβ(ρiδβγ − qiγ).
With regards to the first term of (4.41), Lemma A.2 in Appendix A and the
definition (4.36) of κ yield Lq(q + θz) ≥ 12m‖P (z)‖2θ2 ≥ 12mκ2ρ2θ2. Moreover, we
have already seen in the proof of Theorem 4.4 that the second term of (4.41) is
bounded above:
(4.42)
1
2
∑
i
λi
ρi
θ2
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγziβziγ ≤
1
2
ρλσ2θ2.
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We are thus left to estimate the last term of (4.41). To that end, (4.15) gives:∑i
β,γ
qiβ (ρiδβγ − qiγ)σ2βγ =
∑
r
σ2ryir(ρi − yir) ≤
1
4
ρ2iσ
2(4.43)
where the last inequality stems from the bound yir(ρi − yir) ≤ 14ρ2i (recall that
0 ≤ yir ≤ ρi). Combining all of the above, we then get:
(4.44) − LHq(x;λ) ≥ 1
2
mκ2ρ2θ2 − 1
2
ρλσ2θ2 − 1
8
ρλσ2 ≡ g(θ), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
As a result, if λ < 45λ0 where λ0 =
mρκ2
σ2 , it is easy to see that the RHS of (4.44)
will be increasing for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Moreover, it will also be positive for θλ < θ ≤ 1,
where θλ is the positive root of g: θλ = 12 (λ0/λ− 1)−1/2.
So, pick some positive a < g(1) = 12ρσ
2
(
λ0 − 54λ
)
and consider the set Ka =
{q + θz : z ∈ Sq, g(θ) ≤ a}. By construction, Ka is a compact neighbourhood of q
which does not intersect bd(∆) and, by (4.44), we have LHq(x;λ) ≤ −a outsideKa.
Therefore, if τa ≡ τKa denotes the hitting time τa = inf{t : X(t) ∈ Ka}, Theorem
5.3 in Durrett (1996, p. 268) yields:
(4.45) Ex[τa] ≤ Hq(x;λ)
a
<∞
for every interior initial condition X(0) = x ∈ Int(∆).
Inspired by a trick of Imhof (2005), let us now consider the transformed process
Y (t) = Ψ(X(t)) given by Ψiµ(x) = log xiµ/xi,0, µ ∈ A∗i ≡ Ai \{αi,0}. With ∂Ψiµ∂xiµ =
1/xiµ and
∂Ψiµ
∂xi,0
= −1/xi,0, Itô’s formula gives:
(4.46) dYiµ = LΨiµ(X) dt+ dUiµ − dUi,0 = LΨiµ(X) dt+
∑
r
Qirµσr dWr,
where Qirµ = P irµ − P ir,0 are the components of the redundancy matrix Q of Q in
the basis e˜iµ = eiµ − ei,0 of Tq∆ – recall also (2.14) and the relevant discussion in
Section 2.2.
We now claim that the generator of Y is elliptic. Indeed, if we drop the user
index i for convenience and set Aµr = Qrµσr, µ ∈
∐
iA
∗
i , it suffices to show
that the matrix AAT is positive-definite. Sure enough, for any tangent vector z =∑
µ zµe˜µ ∈ Tq∆, we get:
(4.47)
〈Az,Az〉 =
∑
µ,ν
(
AAT
)
µν
zµzν =
∑
µ,ν
∑
r
QrµQrνσ
2
rzµzν =
∑
r
σ2rw
2
r ,
where w = Q(z). Since Q is irreducible, we will have w 6= 0, and in view of (4.47)
above, this proves our assertion.
We have thus shown that the process Y (t) hits a compact neighbourhood of
Ψ(q) in finite time (on average), and also that the generator of Y is elliptic. From
the criteria of Bhattacharya (1978, Lemma 3.4) it follows that Y is recurrent, and
since Ψ is invertible in Int(∆), the same must hold for X(t) as well. In a similar
fashion, these criteria also ensure that the transition probabilities of the diffusion
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X(t) converge in total variation to an invariant probability measure pi on ∆, thus
proving the first part of our theorem.
To obtain the estimate (4.38), note that Dynkin’s formula (see e.g. Øksendal,
2007, Theorem 7.4.1) applied to (4.44) yields:
Ex [Hq(X(t);λ)] = Hq(x;λ) +Ex
[∫ t
0
LHq(X(s);λ) ds
](4.48)
≤ Hq(x;λ)− 1
2
ρσ2(λ0 − λ)Ex
[∫ t
0
Θ2q(X(s)) ds
]
+
1
8
ρλσ2t,
and with Ex[Hq(X(t);λ)] ≥ 0, we easily get:
(4.49) Ex
[
1
t
∫ t
0
Θ2q(X(s)) ds
]
≤ θ2λ +
C
t
, where C =
2
ρσ2
Hq(x;λ)
λ0 − λ .
We are thus left to establish the bound pi(Bθ) ≥ 1 − θ2λ/θ2 which shows that
the invariant measure pi concentrates its mass around the “projective balls” Bθ. For
that, we will use the ergodic property of X(t), namely that:
(4.50) pi(Bθ) = lim
t→∞Ex
[
1
t
∫ t
0
χBθ (X(s)) ds
]
,
where χBθ is the indicator function of Bθ. However, with Θ2q(x)/θ2 ≥ 1 outside Bθ
by definition, it easily follows that:
(4.51) Ex
[
1
t
∫ t
0
χBθ (X(s)) ds
]
≥ Ex
[
1
t
∫ t
0
(
1−Θ2q(X(s))
/
θ2
)
ds
]
and the bound (4.39) follows by letting t→∞ in (4.49).
We conclude this section with a few remarks on our results so far:
Remark 1 (Learning vs. Noise). The nature of our bounds reveals a most
interesting feature of the replicator equation (4.4). On the one hand, as λ→ 0, we
also get θλ → 0 and the invariant measure pi converges vaguely to a point mass at
q. Hence, if the learning rate λ is slow enough (or if the noise σ is low enough), we
recover Theorem 3.2 (as we should!). On the other hand, there is a clear downside
to using very slow learning rates: the expected time to hit a neighbourhood of an
equilibrium is inversely proportional to λ. As a result, choosing learning rates is a
delicate process and users will have to balance the rate versus the desired sharpness
of their convergence.
Remark 2 (The Effect of Redundancy). The irreducibility assumption is actu-
ally quite important: it appears both in the “slow-learning” condition (4.37) (recall
that ess(q) = 0 if q is an interior point of a reducible network) and also in the proof
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that the generator of Y (t) = Ψ(X(t)) is elliptic. This shows that the stochastic dy-
namics (4.4) are not obvlivious to redundant degrees of freedom, in stark contrast
with the deterministic case (Theorem 3.2).
Regardless, we expect that an analogue for Theorem 4.6 still holds for reducible
networks if we replace q with the entire (affine) set ∆∗. More precisely, we conjecture
that under a suitably modified learning condition, the transition probabilities of
X(t) converge to an invariant distribution which concentrates mass around ∆∗ (see
Fig. 4(b)). One way to prove this claim would be to find a suitable way to “quotient
out” kerQ but, since the replicator equation (4.4) is not invariant over the redundant
fibres x+ kerQ, x ∈ ∆, we have not yet been able to do so.
Remark 3 (Sharpness). We should also note here that the bounds we obtained
are not the sharpest possible ones. For example, the learning condition (4.37) can
be tightened and the assumption that φ′r > 0 can actually be dropped. In that case
however, the corresponding expressions would become significantly more compli-
cated without adding adding much essence, so we have opted to keep our analysis
focused on the simpler estimates.
5. Discussion. In this last section, we will discuss some issues that have not
been thoroughly addressed in the rest of the paper and provide some directions for
future work.
Learning and Optimality. We have already noted that the traffic flows which
minimise the aggregate latency ω(x) =
∑
i ρiωi(x) in a network correspond pre-
cisely to the Wardrop equilibria of a congestion model which is defined over the
same network and whose delay functions are given by the “marginal latencies”
φ∗r(yr) = φr(yr) + yrφ
′
r(yr) (see e.g. Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002). Hence, if
we set ω∗iα(x) =
∑i
α P
i
rαφ
∗
r(yr) and substitute ω∗iα instead of ωiα in the replicator
dynamics (3.5) and (4.4), our analysis yields:
Theorem 5.1. Let C ≡ C(Q, φ) be a congestion model with strictly convex
latency functions φr, r ∈ E, and assume that users follow a replicator learning
scheme with cost functions ω∗iα. Then:
1. In the deterministic case (3.5), players converge to a traffic flow which min-
imises the aggregate delay ω(x) =
∑
ρiωi(x).
2. In the stochastic case (4.4), if the network is irreducible and the players’
learning rates are slow enough, their time-averaged flows will be concentrated
near the (necessarily unique) optimal distribution q which minimises ω.
Of course, for a sharper statement one need only reformulate Theorems 3.2, 4.3,
and 4.6 accordingly (the convexity of φ∗r replaces the monotonicity requirement
for φr). The only thing worthy of note here is that the marginal costs φ∗r(yr) do
not really constitute “local information” that users can acquire simply by routing
their traffic and recording the delays that they experience. However, the missing
components yrφ′r(yr) can easily be measured by observers monitoring the edges of
the network and could be subsequently publicised to all users that employ the edge
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r ∈ E. Consequently, if the adminstrators of a network wish users to figure out the
optimal traffic allocation on their own, they simply have to go the (small) extra
distance of providing such monitors on the network’s links.
Equilibrium Classes. In a certain sense, interior and strict equilibria represent
the extreme ends of the Wardrop spectrum, so it was a reasonable choice to focus
our analysis on them. Nevertheless, there are equilibrium classes that we did not
consider: for instance, there are pure Wardrop equilibria which are not strict, or
there could be “quasi-strict” equilibria q in the boundary of ∆ with the property
that ωiα(q) > ωi(q) for all α which are not present in q.
Strictly speaking, such equilibria are not covered by either Theorem 4.3 or The-
orem 4.6. Still, by a suitable modification of our stochastic calculations, we may
obtain similar convergence and stability results for these types of equilibria as well.
For example, modulo a “slow-learning” condition similar to (4.37), it is easy to see
that pure equilibria that are not strict are still stochastically stable. The reason we
have opted not to consider all these special cases is that it would be too much trou-
ble for little gain: the assortment of similar-looking results that we would obtain in
this way would confuse things more than it would clarify them.
Exponential Learning. In the context of N -person Nash games, we have already
mentioned that the replicator dynamics also arise as the result of an “exponential
learning” process, itself a variant of logistic fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine,
1998; Mertikopoulos and Moustakas, 2009a). The way this scheme works is that
players keep cumulative scores of their strategies’ performance and they employ
each strategy with a probability which is exponentially proportional to these scores.
As such, it is not too hard to adapt this method directly to our congestion setting.
In more detail, assume that all users i ∈ N keep performance scores Viα of the
paths at their disposal as specified by the differential equation:
(5.1) dViα(t) = −ωiα(x(t)) dt,
where x(t) is the traffic profile at time t. Based on these scores, the users then
update their traffic flows according to the Boltzmann distribution:
(5.2) xiα(t) =
eλiViα(t)∑i
β e
λiViβ(t)
,
where λi denotes the learning rate of player i ∈ N (this expression also explains
why these rates can be seen as inverse temperatures). In this way, by decoupling
these expressions, one obtains the deterministic replicator equation (3.5).
We thus see that exponential learning tells us nothing new in deterministic en-
vironments. In the presence of noise however, the scores Viα also reflect any fluctu-
ations in the observed delays, so we obtain instead:
(5.3) dViα(t) = −ωiα(X) dt+ σiα dUiα,
where, as in (4.3), dUiα describes the total noise along the path α ∈ Ai. Therefore,
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if the users’ flow profile X(t) is updated according to (5.2), Itô’s lemma now gives:
dXiα = λiXiα [ωi(X)− ωiα(X)] dt+ λiXiα
[
dUiα − ρ−1i
∑i
β
Xiβ dUiβ
]
+
λ2i
2
Xiα
[∑i
β
(ρiδαβ − 2Xiβ)σ2αβ − ρ−1i
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγXiγ(ρiδβγ − 2Xiβ)
]
dt.(5.4)
As far as the rationality properties of these new dynamics are concerned, a
simple modification in the proof of Theorem 4.3 suffices to show that strict Wardrop
equilibria are stochastically stable in (5.4). Just the same, the extra drift term in
(5.4) complicates things considerably, so results containing explicit estimates of
hitting times are significantly harder to obtain. Of course, this approach might well
lead to improved convergence rates, but since the calculations would take us too
far afield, we prefer to postpone this analysis for the future.
The Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics. Another powerful learning scheme is
given by the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamics (see e.g. Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998) where users look at the “excess delays”
(5.5) ψiα(x) = [ωi(x)− ωiα(x)]+ = max {ωi(x)− ωiα(x), 0}
and update their traffic flows according to the differential equation:
(5.6)
dxiα
dt
= ψiα(x(t))− ψi(x(t)),
where ψi(x) = ρ−1i
∑i
α xiαψiα(x). On the negative side, these dynamics require
users to monitor delays even along paths that they do not employ. On the other
hand, they satisfy the pleasant property of “non-complacency” (Sandholm, 2001):
the stationary states of (5.6) coincide with the game’s Wardrop equilibria and every
solution trajectory converges to a connected set of such equilibria.
In terms of convergence to a Wardrop equilibrium, Theorem 3.2 shows that the
replicator dynamics behave at least as well as the BNN dynamics (except perhaps
on the boundary of ∆), so there is no real reason to pick the more complicated
expressions (5.5), (5.6). However, this might not be true in the presence of stochastic
fluctuations: in fact, virtually nothing is known about the behaviour of the BNN
dynamics in stochastic environments so this question alone makes pursuing this
direction a worthwhile project.
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APPENDIX A: PROPERTIES OF THE ADJOINT POTENTIAL
We collect here some of the most useful properties of the adjoint potential :
(3.9) Lq(x) ≡
∑
i,α
(xiα − qiα)ωiα(x) =
∑
r
(yr − y∗r )φr(yr) ≡ Λ(y).
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To begin with, the equality in (3.9) stems from the invariance identity:
(A.1)
∑
α
zαωα =
∑
α
∑
r
zαPrαφr =
∑
r
wrφr, z ∈ V
where P : V →W is the indicator matrix of the network Q and w = P (z). It is then
easy to verify that Lq(x) = Lq(x′) whenever x′ − x ∈ kerQ (thus justifying (3.9)),
and also that Lq = Lq′ iff q′ − q ∈ kerQ. As a result, the notation Lq(x) ≡ Λ(y) is
consistent with any choice of q ∈ ∆∗.
This “adjoint” potential owes its name to the formula for integration by parts:
(A.2)
∑
r
∫ yr
y∗r
φr(w) dw =
∑
r
(yr − y∗r )φr(yr)−
∑
r
∫ yr
y∗r
wφ′r(w) dw.
Since the latencies φr are increasing, this expression immediately yields the estimate
(3.9): Φ(y) − Φ(y∗) ≤ Λ(y). However, if we also assume that q is strict (say q =∑
i ρiei,0 for convenience), we can get a more direct bound:
Lemma A.1. Let q =
∑
i ρiei,0 be a strict Wardrop equilibrium and let z ∈ Tq∆.
Then, for all t ≥ 0 such that x(t) = q + tz ∈ ∆, we have:
(A.3) Lq(q + tz) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
∆ωi‖zi‖1t, where ∆ωi = minµ6=0{ωiµ(q)− ωi,0(q)} .
Proof. Clearly, to have q + tz ∈ ∆ for some t > 0, z must be of the form:
(A.4)
z =
∑
i
zi with zi =
∑i
µ
ziµ(eiµ − ei,0) and ziµ ≥ 0 for all µ ∈ A∗i ≡ Ai \{0}.
So, let f(t) = Φ(y(t)) where y(t) = P (x(t)) = y∗ + tw and w = P (z). With Φ
convex, we get f(t) ≥ f(0) + f ′(0)t and a simple differentiation yields: f ′(0) =
d
dt
∣∣
t=0
∑
r Φr(y
∗
r + twr) =
∑
r wrφr(y
∗
r ). However, thanks to (A.1) and (A.4), we
may rewrite this sum as:∑
r
wrφr(y
∗
r ) =
∑
i
∑i
α
ziαωiα(q) =
∑
i
∑i
µ
ziµ [ωiµ(q)− ωi,0(q)](A.5)
≥
∑
i
∑i
µ
ziµ∆ωi =
1
2
∑
i
∆ωi‖zi‖1,
because ‖zi‖1 =
∑i
α |ziα| =
∣∣∣−∑iµ ziµ∣∣∣+∑iµ |ziµ| = 2∑iµ ziµ. We thus obtain:
(A.6) Lq(q + tz) = Λ(y∗ + tw) ≥ f(t)− f(0) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
∆ωi‖zi‖1t.
This lemma shows that Lq increases at least linearly along all “inward” rays
q + tz.3 This is not so if q is an interior equilibrium:
3It is interesting to note here the relation with Proposition 2.7: if the ray q + tz is inward-
pointing, then z cannot be “redundant”, i.e. we cannot have z ∈ kerP .
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Lemma A.2. Let q ∈ Int(∆) be an interior Wardrop equilibrium and let z ∈
Tq∆. Then, for all t ≥ 0 such that x(t) = q + tz ∈ ∆, we have:
(A.7) Lq(q + tz) ≥ 12m‖P (z)‖2t2, where m = inf{φ′r(yr) : r ∈ E, y ∈ P (∆)}.
Proof. Following the proof of Lemma A.1 above, we obtain:
(A.8) f ′(0) =
∑
i
∑i
α
ziαωiα(q) =
∑
i
∑i
α
ziαωi(q) = 0
where the second equality follows from the fact that q is an interior equilibrium
(that is, ωiα(q) = ωi(q) for all paths α ∈ Ai), and the last one is a consequence of
z being tangent to ∆ (meaning that
∑i
α ziα = 0). On the other hand, we also get:
(A.9) f ′′(t) =
d2
dt2
∑
r
Φr(y
∗
r + twr) =
∑
r
w2rφ
′
r(y
∗
r + twr).
Clearly, since the set P (∆) of load profiles y is compact and the (continuous)
functions φ′r are positive, we will also have m = inf{φ′r(yr) : y ∈ P (∆), r ∈ E} > 0.
We will thus have f(t) ≥ 12mt2, and a first order Taylor expansion with Lagrange
remainder easily yields:
(A.10) Lq(q + tz) = Λ(y∗ + tw) ≥ f(t)− f(0) ≥ 12m‖P (z)‖2t2.
APPENDIX B: STOCHASTIC CALCULATIONS
This appendix is devoted to the calculations that are hidden under the hood of
(4.13), the equation that describes the evolution of the relative entropy Hq(x;λ).
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let Vq(t) = Hq(X(t);λ). We then have:
dVq =
∑
i,α
∂Hq
∂xiα
dXiα +
1
2
∑
i,α
∑
j,β
∂2Hq
∂xiα∂xjβ
(dXiα)·(dXjβ)(B.1)
= −
∑
i,α
1
λi
qiα
xiα
dXiα +
1
2
∑
i,α
1
λi
qiα
x2iα
(dXiα)
2
.
However, with X(t) being as in (4.4), we readily obtain:
(B.2) (dXiα)
2
= λ2iX
2
iα
(
dUiα − ρ−1i
∑i
β
Xiβ dUiβ
)2
= λ2iX
2
iα
[
(dUiα)
2 − 2
ρi
∑i
β
Xiβ dUiα · dUiβ + 1
ρ2i
∑i
β,γ
XiβXiγ dUiβ · dUiγ
]
= λ2iX
2
iα
[
σ2iα −
2
ρi
∑i
β
σ2αβXiβ +
1
ρ2i
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγXiβXiγ
]
dt.
As a result, we may combine the two equations (B.1) and (B.2) to obtain:
dVq = −
∑
i,α
qiα [ωi(X)− ωiα(X)] dt−
∑
i,α
qiα
[
dUiα − ρ−1i
∑i
β
Xiβ dUiβ
](B.3)
+
1
2
∑
i,α
λiqiα
[
σ2iα −
2
ρi
∑i
β
σ2αβXiβ +
1
ρ2i
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγXiβXiγ
]
dt.
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Therefore, if we focus at a particular user i ∈ N, the last term of (B.3) gives:∑i
α
qiα
[
σ2iα −
2
ρi
∑i
β
σ2αβXiβ +
1
ρ2i
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγXiβXiγ
]
=
∑i
α
qiασ
2
iα −
2
ρi
∑i
α,β
σ2αβqiαXiβ +
1
ρi
∑i
β,γ
σβγXiβXiγ
=
∑i
α
qiασ
2
iα −
1
ρi
∑i
β,γ
qiβqiγσ
2
βγ
+
1
ρi
[∑i
β,γ
qiβqiγσ
2
βγ − 2
∑i
β,γ
Xiβqiγσ
2
βγ +
∑i
β,γ
XiβXiγσ
2
βγ
]
=
1
ρi
[∑i
β,γ
qiβ(ρiδβγ − qiγ)σ2βγ +
∑i
β,γ
σ2βγ(Xiβ − qiβ)(Xiγ − qiγ)
]
(B.4)
and the lemma follows by substituting (B.4) into (B.3) and keeping only the result-
ing drift, that is, the first and third terms of (B.3).
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